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Supervisory Responsibility for the Office of Legal
Counsel
AVIDAN

Y.

COVER*

ABSTRACT

In the wake of the notorious Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) torture memoranda, various reforms have been proposed to prevent future
erroneous and poorly reasoned legal opinions on matters of the utmost national
importance. The need for refonn is all the more pressing in a post-9/11 world in
which the Executive Branch will continue to arrogate, often in secret, various
national security-related powers. None of the proposals, however, addresses the
supervismy role that Justice Depmtment and other Executive Branch lawyers
play in the formation of OLC opinions.
This Article argues that the failure to hold more senior government lawyers
accountable for the ethical failures of their subordinates dooms the many
laudable proposals aimed at protecting against flawed OLC legal advice. By
letting higher-up lawyers off the hook, these proposals ignore the collective
nature of OLC opinion writing. More ominous, the failure to hold supervisors
responsible encourages senior public officials to disengage from difficult legal
analyses, therefore depriving opinions of their judgment, expertise, and experience. Most importantly, these officials are better situated to withstand the
pressure to approve Executive branch actions.
This Article proposes a new professional rule of conduct and process that
addresses the responsibilities of senior executive branch lawyers and supervising
lawyers who work with OLC lawyers. The proposal will require a greater number
of senior lawyers to review and sign off on OLC opinions and to correct
deficiencies where they perceive them. Adhering to the proposal will increase
oversight of the OLC, ensure greater accountability, and lead to better and more
independent legal advice for the Executive Branch.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. My grateful thanks to Baber
Azmy, Jonathan Entin, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Sharona Hoffman, Jacqueline Lipton, Jon Romberg,
Michael Scharf, Glen Staszewski, and participants in the Michigan State University College of Law Junior
Faculty Workshop for their helpful comments.© 2012, Avidan Y. Cover.
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INTRODUCTION

Matthew Lauer: Why is waterboarding legal, in your opinion?
President George W. Bush: Because the lawyer said it was legal. 1

The disclosure of U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
memorar1da on the applicability of the federal anti-torture statute to CIA
interrogation methods, which included the determination that waterboarding was
legal, has .elicited numerous criticisms, government reports, and articles concerning the soundness of the opinions themselves and the accountability of the
principal authors. 2 The interest has been generated, in part, by the controversial
issues at the heart of the opinions, but also by the particular power of OLC, which
may issue opinions that are binding and are effectively Executive Branch law and
can remain secret from the public and from the other branches of government.
Much attention has focused on the ethical breaches of the memoranda's authors
Jolm Yoo and Jay Bybee. 3 Additionally, former OLC attorneys have proposed
guiding principles and OLC established best practices, as well as some structural
changes to the Office, to ensure that opinions are written with greater objectivity
and candor. 4 Missing from the numerous critiques and proposals is a sufficiently

1. NBC News Special: "Decision Points", (NBC television broadcast Nov. 8, 2010) (interview by Mattthew
Lauer with former President George W. Bush) (transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40076644/
ns/politics-decision_pointsl).
2. Memorandum from JayS. Bybee, AssistantAtt'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to White
House Counsel Alberto S. Gonzales, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (August 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum], available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.
findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/ bybee80102mem.pdf; Memorandum from JayS. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Acting General Counsel John Rizzo of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (August 1, 2002) [hereinafter Classified Bybee Memorandum],
available at http://dspace. wrlc.org /doc/bitstream/204ln0967/00355_02080 1_004display.pdf.
3. OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INvESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF
"ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 16 (JULY 29, 2009) (hereinafter OPR
REPORT], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ OPRFinalReport090729.pdf; Memorandum from
David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Re: Memorandum of Decision
Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional
Responsibility's Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected
Terrorists 2 (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Margolis Memorandum], available at http:/!judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
pdf/DAGMargolisMemol00105.pdf.
4. Walter E. Dellinger, Dawn Johnsen et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (2004)
[hereinafter Guidelines], reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, Constitutional 'Niches': The Role of Institutional
Context in Constitutional Low: Faithfully Executing the Lows: lntemal Legal Constraints of Executive Power,
54 UCLA L. REv. 1559, app. 2 (2007); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting AssistantAtt'y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to Att'ys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions (July
16, 20 10) [hereinafter 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olclegal-advice-opinions.pdf (updating Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Att'ys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Opinions (May 16, 2005)
[hereinafter 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov /olc!best-practicesmemo.pdf.).
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rigorous consideration of the role of the authors' superiors in the crafting of the
memoranda and what, if any, responsibility they bear, and, going forward, what
rules of professional conduct should govern the supervisors of lawyers crafting
legal opinions on the utmost sensitive issues confronting the Executive Branch.
This Article argues that holding the opinion authors' supervisors responsible is
vital to ensuring that the Department of Justice, and specifically OLC, provides
independent legal advice to the President and the Executive Branch. The need for
independent legal advice is more pronounced during a "Terror Presidency,"5 a
period of crisis over which the Executive appears poised to preside indefinitely.
Given the technological potential for catastrophic attacks, any President will
continue to claim extensive powers for the foreseeable future. 6 OLC is therefore
an ever more vital internal check, a crucial part of Executive process, which can
ensure the legality of Executive actions and curb excesses.
Without holding particular senior Executive branch lawyers and supervisors
responsible for the actions of their OLC subordinates, however, OLC may serve
more as rubber stamp than as a true legal advisor or check on the post-9/11
Presidency. An emphasis on supervisory responsibility requires an expanded and
more rigorous conception and regulation of supervisory lawyers, which must also
buttress and reinforce a set of legal values in OLC. The prior focus on the
individual authors of the opinions ignores the collective nature of legal work and
the legal norms and ethics that are communicated within the process of authming
legal opinions. Emphasizing the professional misconduct of individual lawyers,
without looking at superiors' roles, may lead to scapegoating individual lawyers
and obfuscating what is in fact a deficient ethical infrastructure of the office.
Additionally, proposed institutional infrastructural changes may not prevent
similarly poor legal opinions in the future because they fail to sufficiently clarify
the normative foundations of the Office.
This Article proposes a more expansive formulation of the Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.1, concerning supervisory responsibility, specific to
OLC. The current version of Rule 5.1 provides that law firm partners and lawyers
with similar managerial authority must take steps to ensure compliance with the
Model Rules. 7 The Rule also imposes similar obligations on direct supervisors. 8
Supervising lawyers may be held responsible for their subordinates' professional
misconduct if they order the conduct, know of the misconduct and ratify it, or fail
to takes steps to mitigate the consequences of the misconduct. 9 The current rule

5. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
183-84 (2007).
6. !d.
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 {a) (2010) [hereimifter MODEL RULES].
8. MODELRULESR.5.l(b).

9. MODEL RULES R. 5.1 (c)(!), {2).
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does not, however, require sufficient oversight on the part of supervisors for an
office such as OLC, where the work touches on ethically fraught issues of the
highest national importance.
The new iteration of Rule 5.1 institutes a number of structural changes to OLC
that are intended to safeguard independent legal advice, including a two-year
limitation on the tenure of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of OLC; a
requirement that the Attorney General sign any opinions concluding that the
President is not bound by particular laws; and the insertion of a permanent ethics
advisor within OLC. The Rule also requires supervising lawyers to make greater
efforts to learn of ethical misconduct on the part of their OLC subordinates and to
make greater efforts to nimediate breaches, based in part on the seriousness of the
issue at stake, e.g., potential waterboarding of detainees. The Rule also expands
the definition of supervisor, clarifying that lawyers holding senior positions
outside of OLC who review and comment upon drafts have an obligation to
reasonably supervise the primary authors of the memo. Clarification of the
supervisory role that certain Executive Branch lawyers play, and a corresponding
delineation of their responsibilities, will deter lawyers, supervisors, and subordinates alike, from succumbing to bystander apathy. As a result, lawyers will take
greater ownership for the legal opinions generated by the office. In so doing,
Executive Branch lawyers will develop and adhere to a normative foundation that
demands fealty to the law above loyalty to the client.
Section I of this Article provides a background on OLC and the authority of its
opinions. I also review the drafting of the torture memoranda, including the role
played by senior lawyers. Section II examines different approaches that have
been taken to hold lawyers involved in the preparation of the memoranda
accountable, specifically through civil lawsuits, OLC Guiding Principles and
Best Practices, and government ethics investigations. Section III briefly addresses the literature on some of the perceived limitations in the current system
for regulation of lawyers, particularly its normative shortcomings. Section N
outlines Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1, which specifically addresses
supervisory responsibility, as an example of a rule that can reflect an ethic of
accountability without external enforcement. Finally, Sections V and VI discuss
the proposed Rule 5.1 specific to OLC that would address OLC's unique
authority, and require politically accountable senior Executive lawyers'
meaningful dialogue with those lawyers drafting opinions. In recognizing the .
inherently social and collective nature of lawyering, the Rule requires that rather
than permitting instances of bystander apathy and deflection of responsibility,
these interactions must be opportunities for generating norms that can
establish a set of collective values for the Executive Branch. I also offer
examples of how and why Rule 5.1 would apply to senior Executive lawyers
Attorney General John Ashcroft and· Assistant Attorney General Michael
Chertoff.
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BACKGROUND ON THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S DRAFTING OF THE
TORTURE MEMORANDA

A. THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

Lawyers working in OLC wield unique and enormous power. Opinions
authored by lawyers in the office can enjoy a force of authority akin to that of
controlling law, and may even be kept secret. Pursuant to the Attorney General's
delegation, the Assistant Attorney General who heads OLC is tasked with a
number of responsibilities, including preparing formal opinions by the Attorney
General, and assisting the Attorney General in his legal adviser capacity to the
President and to the Cabinet. 10 The office may be asked to resolve legal disputes
between differing executive agencies. 11 Formal written opinions by OLC
constitute "controlling legal advice to Executive Branch officials in furtherance
of the President's constitutional duties to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution" and the "Take Care" Clause. 12 Because these opinions may address
matters of first impression that will never be ruled on by a court, they may
constitute the final and binding interpretation of law. 13 Finally, due to the often
sensitive nature of the opinions, particularly those that may concern national
security, they may go unpublished and undisclosed. 14
The OLC, like other components of the Department of Justice, is headed by an
Assistant Attorney General, a political appointee requiring Senate confirmation.15 The Office is comprised of about two dozen lawyers, of whom a number
may be Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, who are also political appointees but
do not require Senate confirmation. 16 The bulk of the lawyers are career civil
servants. 17
OLC lawyers are subject to the same rules of professional responsibility as
other lawyers. 18 As lawyers advising the President and other Executive Agency

10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 510-513 (2006); 28 C.F.R. 0.25(a) (2010). Also pertinent here, the regulations provide that
the OLC is responsible for advising on the "legal aspects of treaties and other international agreements." 28
C.F.R. 0.25(d) (2010).
11. Exec. Order No. 12146, 1-4 (codified at 3 C.F.R. 409, 4100 (1980)); Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1577.
12. See 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 4; 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum
supra note 4; Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1577.
13. 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1; Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1577; Robert C.
Power, Lawyers and the War, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 39, 49-50 (2009); Trevor Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office
of Legal Counsel, 110 CoLUM. L. REv. 1448, 1463-68 (2010).
14. The Office of Legal Counsel only publishes opinions which it has determined are "appropriate for
publication." Office of Legal Counsel Website, Opinions, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions.htrn
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
15. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL
SUBMISSION, (hereinafter FY 20ll PERFORMANCE BUDGET], available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/
20lljustification/pdf/fyll-olc-justification.pdf; Morrison, supra note 13, at 1460.
16. FY 20ll PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 15, at I; Morrison, supra note 13, at 1460.
17. Morrison, supra note 13, at 1460.
18. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.
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heads, the most applicable rule governing their legal work is to be found in Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1, which requires a lawyer to "exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice." 19 As in many
lawyering contexts, however, there arise tensions between the OLC lawyer's
obligation to provide objective and candid advice to the client and to abide by or
help realize the client's-here, the President's-objectives. 20 The nature ofthe
OLC position, however, offers, according to some scholars, a "schizophrenic
choice" between objective interpreter of law and political advocate for administration policies. 21
OLC's function as an effective maker of law for the Executive Branch
distinguishes its relationship to the Executive from any traditional lawyer-client
relationship. On the one hand, there is the aspirational view that the job of the
Attorney General is to be an independent, impartial interpreter of the law. On the
other hand, there is the historically based or realist view that the Attorney General
and OLC attorney can be considered a legal policy figure, who seek to carry out
the President's objectives first, with a secondary consideration of the legal
constraints.Z2
The conception of the independent and impartial legal adviser is best
encapsulated in OLC Best· Practices memoranda and Guiding Principles that
e1llerged in response to the initial public disclosure of the earliest opinions on
torture and interrogation. Former OLC attorneys wrote that the "OLC should
provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice
will constrain the administration's pursuit of desired policies." 23 The Guiding
Principles appear to dismiss the "advocacy model of lawyering"-defined as the
crafting of "merely plausible legal arguments to support their clients' desired
actions"-because it "inadequately promotes the President's constitutional
obligation to ensure the legality of executive action." 24 Similarly, OLC issued a
Best Practices memorandum in 2005, explaining that OLC must offer "candid,
independent, and principled advice-even when that advice may be inconsistent
19. MODEL RULES R. 2.1.
20. Compare MODEL RuLES R. 2.1 with 1.2(a) and 1.3 (Diligence.) Notwithstanding changes in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the tensions reflect the prior Code rule, which articulated a zealous
representation on behalf of the client. The comment to Rule 1.3 retains the "zealous" strand, providing: "A
lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf." Accordingly, the revisions and amendments to rules have not eradicated the vestiges of
this tension. Indeed, one may query whether the current articulations in 1.2 and 1.3 in any way diminish the
view, well-established in the bar's history and in popular imagination, of the paramount obligation of zealous
representation.
21. Power, supra note 13, at 49-50. See also John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the
Attomey General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, !5 CARDOZO L. REv. 375,377,403
(1993).
22. See generally Norman Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attomey General, 60
STAN. L. REv. 1931, 1933-36 (2008).
23. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1.
24. !d.

2012]

275

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEGAL COUNSEL

with the desires ofpolicymakers."

25

And Professor Dawn Johnsen, a former OLC

attorney and once nominee to head OLC during the Obama Administration,
identified the Office's most important function as "the ability to say no to the
President."

26

This conception of the Office has elements of a judicial or

quasi-judicial role, due in part to the binding effect of its opinions.

27

Professor

David Luban has contended that the obligation of impartiality is only heightened
by virtue of the secret aspect and the constitutional obligation to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. "

28

These views are further supported by the

general notion that government lawyers must serve the public interest-that, in
the words of the oft cited

Berger v. United States

overriding obligation to see that justice is done."

opinion, "government has an

29

In contrast, the historical/realist view of OLC considers the role of the OLC
attorney as more of an advocate or team player and enabler of Executive Branch
policy.

30

Johnsen aclmowledges that "OLC's role is more complicated than that

of a disinterested arbiter.'m Professor Norman Spaulding questions what it even
means to call for an independent Attorney General, contending that invariably the
role, which entails offering opinions, is inherently "legal and political. "

32

In his

history of the evolution of the Office of the Attorney General through the
Reconstruction era, he describes an Office that has been politically accountable to
the President, which requires the diminishment of independence, and which has

25. 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1.
26. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1582-83.
27. !d. at 1581-82; see also DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 203 (2009) (describing legal
advice as "quasi-judicial"; "written opinions binding entire departments of the government are judicial in a
more direct way").
28. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 203; see also OPR Report, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that the lack of
adversarial process makes the situation the OLC lawyer practices in similar to that of a lawyer appearing in an
ex parte proceeding, which then requires disclosure of all material facts to court, whether or not they are
adverse, citing MODEL RULES R. 3.3(d)).
29. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 17, n. 18 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). But see
Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59 EMORY L. J. 333, 343-45 (2009) (collecting
sources criticizing concept of government lawyer's obligations to public interest over the client). For a
discussion of the variation in the national security lawyer's duties based upon the identity of the client and the
model oflegal practice, see JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS
TIMES 317-25 (2007).
30. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1583; McGinnis, supra note 21, at 377, 403; Power, supra note 13, at
54-56 (discussing dueling allegiances of fidelity to law, being a team player, and an enabler). Also reflecting the
"enabler" view, John Yoo observes that the Justice Department has a "long tradition in defending the President's
commander-in-chief power." JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
185 (2006).
31. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1581.
32. See Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1934, 1968-69. In discussing independence of the Office of the Attorney
General, Spaulding refers to a criterion that he insists must be employed separate from the context of ultra vires
or illegal actions already taken by the Executive; otherwise, he explains, the term is oflittle utility in analyzing
the conduct of governmental lawyers from the office. Id. at 1935. I too adopt this understanding of independence
for purposes of this article. The inquiry concerns the independence of OLC's initial position or approach to
issues and policies subjected to its analysis.
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historically resisted any structural changes. 33
Though agreeing "as a general matter" that OLC should serve an independent
role, Professor Jack Goldsmith, former head of OLC, tempers his agreement with
a series of "caveats," including questioning whether OLC may offer advice akin
to "an attorney's advice to a client about what you can get away with and what
you are allowed to do and what your risks are, something in between," whether
OLC is bound by Supreme Court opinions, and the import of classification on that
independent role. 34 Similar to Spaulding, Goldsmith invokes the historical
experience of OLC, contending that no head of the office has ever fully provided
independent legal advice, citing the examples of Attorneys General Edward
Bates' opinion supporting the suspension of habeas corpus and Robert Jackson's
opinion supporting the destroyer for bases deal. 35
Empirical research also evidences a very high tendency on the part of OLC to
support the President. Professor Trevor Morrison found that of 245 publicly
available OLC opinions written since the beginning of the Carter Administration
through the first year of the Obama Administration, OLC supported the
President's view in 193 opinions, or 79% of the time. 36 Twenty opinions (8%)
upheld some portion of the President's position and 32 opinions (13%) opposed
the White House's view? 7
Ultimately, Goldsmith appears to have concluded there is not an articulable
standard that governs OLC's provision of legal advice, telling ethics investigators
he could not answer what is the role of OLC and whether an attorney has crossed
a line. 38 Notwithstanding the historical lack of independent legal advice, it is
plainly unacceptable to permit OLC lawyers to provide opinions without any
standard orienting their work and advice. 39 To be sure, the Best Practices

33. ld. at 1953-68, 1977. Spaulding does not despair entirely of the possibility of securing some sort of
independence for the Office of the Attorney General, as is discussed later in this article. See infra Part V.C.2.
34. Margolis Memorandum, srlpra note 3, at 2. A fuller exploration of Goldsmith's views on the ambiguous
and fraught nature of the OLC attorney's task may be found in GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 33-39.
35. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 18-19; GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 168, 195-99; see also John
C. Dehn, Institutional Advocacy, Constitutional Obligations, and Professional Responsibilities: Arguments for
Govemment Lawyering Without Glasses, 110 CoLUt-.1. L. REv. SIDEBAR 73, 74 (2010) (observing that OLC
generally overvalues Executive branch institutional interests).
36. Morrison, supra note 13, at 1476-79. Because the data do not include opinions that remain classified, the
results may be skewed downward. As I discuss in greater detail, lawyers will feel more pr~ssured to provide
legal support for Executive positions that are to be implemented in secret because the matters may concern
national security and there will be few, if any, additional checks on the Executive's actions. See infra Part V.
37. Morrison, supra note 13, at 1476-79.
38. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. Goldsmith offers a more "cooperative" and revealing conception of the
OLC's role and the office's limits in his own book, acknowledging an inevitable tension between articulating the
law and realizing the President's objectives, but ultimately relying on the OLC's own culture and norms,
GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 37-39, a sentiment shared by many OLC veterans. See, e.g., Guidelines, supra note
4, at 1.
39. Jesselyn Radack, a former OPR lawyer, proposes a new role for all government legal advisors that would
include OLC lawyers. In addition to responsibilities set forth in Model Rule 2.1, the proposed rule would
address some of the shortcomings evidenced in the torture memoranda. Proposed Rule 2.2 would require an
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memoranda reflect that view, though they also share some of Goldsmith's
ambivalence about the contours of the role, revealing the Office's seeming latent
schizophrenia. However, a review of the actions taken by OLC lawyers in
crafting the torture memoranda leaves open to question what standard they
thought was governing their conduct. The lack of any articulation of standards by
supervising attorneys during the period in which the initial opinions were written
speaks both to an insufficiently defined legal framework for the OLC and an utter
failure of senior lawyers in their supervisory responsibilities.
B. THE TORTURE MEMORANDA

On August 1, 2002, OLC issued a memorandum (Bybee Memo) concerning
interrogation standards under the U.N. Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment as implemented by the
torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. 40 OLC also issued a classified
memorandum (Classified Bybee Memo) that day explaining whether particular
interrogation methods would violate the tmture statute. These opinions were
drafted primarily by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and
reviewed and signed off on by the head of OLC, then Assistant Attorney General
JayS. Bybee. In support of a working group on detainee interrogations composed
of military and civilian Defense Department personnel, Yoo provided another
memorandum (Yoo Memo), which "incorporated the Bybee Memo virtually in its
entirety," but focused on military, rather than CIA, interrogation. 41
Much of the attention following the leak of Bybee Memo to the press in June
2004 has centered on the role ofYoo and Bybee in producing the opinions. 42 On
June 21, 2004, Congressman Frank Wolf asked the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) to investigate the drafting of the Bybee Memo. 43 Over the
course of almost five years, the OPR investigated the drafting of the Bybee
Memo, and the Classified Bybee Memo, as well as later opinions that purported
to supersede the Bybee Memo and Classified Bybee Memo, as well as
memoranda analyzing the applicability of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee
Treatment Act, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and Article 16 of

advising attorney to disclose majority legal positions when advocating "novel" positions, disclose adverse case
Jaw, and provide advice on the "wisdom and morality" of the client's proposed course of action. Jesselyn
Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: the Role of the Govemmellf Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 1, 42 (2006). Professor Fred C. Zacharias proposes a "moral dialogue" between the lawyer and client when
the conduct might be illegal, requiring a discussion of moral and political considerations. Zacharias, supra note
29, at 262-63.
40. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2.
41. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 49-54.
42. Yoo, in particular, has garnered significant amounts of attention. He has been an unapologetic defender of
the memoranda and their reasoning and conclusions. See Yoo, supra note 30, at 165-202.
43. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
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the Convention Against Torture, to interrogation techniques. 44
Based upon interviews with many of the most important government lawyers
and relying upon government investigations, OPR constructed a comprehensive
and detailed history of the creation of the interrogations memoranda. The impetus
for the opinions was the CIA's interest in employing "harsh" and "more
aggressive" interrogation techniques on an AI Qaeda detainee Abu Zubaydah,
who had been captured in March 2002. 45 The proposed techniques included, (1)
attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial or insult slap, (5) cramped
confinement, (6) insects placed in a confinement box, (7) wall standing, (8) stress
positions, (9) sleep deprivation, (10) use of diapers and denial of toilet facilities,
(11) waterboarding, and (12) mock burial. 46 Concerned that the use of these
techniques might expose personnel to criminal liability, the CIA sought an OLC
opinion on the legality of the techniques. 47
The Bybee memorandum arrived at a number of dubious conclusions
concerning the torture statute, likely foreordained because, as many have
observed, the authors "began with the objective of justifying torture." 48 Based
upon this legal analysis, the Classified Bybee Memo concluded that of the
specific techniques that the CIA proposed using in interrogating Abu Zubaydah,
ten interrogation techniques-including stress positions, sleep deprivation,
exploiting the fear of insects, and waterboarding-would not violate the torture
statute. 49 Eventually, the Bybee Memo and other opinions concerning interrogations were repudiated and have been roundly criticized by OLC attorneys and
44. Id. at 5-9.
45. Id. at 32-34. President Bush acknowledged this history in a speech on September 6, 2006. See George W.
Bush, President, United States of America, Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected
Terrorists, September 6, 2006 [hereinafter President Bush Speech], available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html. President Bush described as "tough" the
"alternative set of procedures" used by the CIA, which were determined to be lawful by the Justice Department.
46. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 35-36. The OPR Report redacted the twelfth technique but it is believed
that, based upon a review of earlier drafts of the OPR Report, this technique was in fact mock burial. See "New
Information on 'Mock Burials,"' TheTortureReport.org, February 26, 2010, http://www.thetorturereport.org/
diary/new-information-%E2%80%9Cmock-burials%E2%80%9D. These techniques were proposed by CIA
psychologists who assisted in the United States Military's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE)
training. Although many of the same techniques proposed for use on Zubaydah were based upon ones used on
U.S. military members in training them to resist interrogations by enemy captors, in contrast to the goal of the
Zubaydah interrogation, SERE exercises were not permitted to develop in the trainee a feeling of "learned
helplessness." OPR Report, supra note 3, at 34.
47. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 37. There is some dispute about whether some of these proposed
techniques were used on Zubaydah prior to receiving OLC's opinions. !d. at 33.
48. Michael Hatfield, Professionalizing Moral Deference, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 1, 3 (2009); see
also Interview with Jack Goldsmith, Frontline, "Cheney's Law, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/cheney/
interviews/goldsmith.html# ixzzlOFcgSapS ("The opinions had an unusually tendentious quality that was not
really consistent with the norms of opinion writing in the Office of Legal Counsel. They were obviously
stretching to reach a result rather than doing a more impassioned analysis."); Anthony Lewis, Making Torture
Legal, THE NEW YoRK REVIEW OF BooKs, July 15, 2004 ("The memos read like the advice of a mob lawyer to a
mafia don on how to skirt the law and stay out of prison.").
49. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 37 (citing Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1-2).
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scholars. 50
The OLC opinions were rife with questionable legal reasoning, omissions, and
mischaracterization. For example, the Bybee Memo provides that in order to
constitute a violation of the torture statute, the infliction of physical pain "must be
equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. " 51 In providing this
definition of "severe pail1" the opinion inexplicably relies on a "statute defining
an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits." 52
Relying upon the health benefits statute was unreasonable because the objectives
of that statute are wholly unrelated to those of the torture statute. 53 General rules
of statutory construction provide that relying on such an unrelated statute is not a
reliable method for divining legislative intent. 5 4 Moreover, the analysis suggests
that anything short of organ failure or death does not constitute torture, an
interpretation unsupported, to be sure, by the health benefits statute. 5 5
The Bybee Memo also offers an overly facile analysis of specific intent. In
order to run afoul of the torture prohibition, the Memorandum provides, the
infliction of severe physical pain or severe mental pain or suffering must be the
"defendant's precise objective." Even if a defendant knows that severe pain will
result from his actions, he may lack specific intent if "causing such harm is not his
objective, even though he does not act in good faith." 56 The Memorandum
ignores the fact that federal case law surrounding the meaning of specific intent is
ambiguous and unclear. 57 In addition, it improperly suggests that motive of the
interrogator could impact the analysis even though the interrogator knowingly
inflicts severe physical pain. 5 8

50. See Memorandum from Acting AssistantAtt'y Gen. Daniel Levin to Deputy Att'y Gen. James B. Corney,
Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 2 (December 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin
Memorandum], available at http:/lwww.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm ("This memorandum supersedes the August 2002 Memorandum in its entirety."); Memorandum from Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. David J.
Barron to Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Re: Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions 1
(Aprill5, 2009), available at http:/lwww.justice.gov/olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf. Upon reviewing the Yoo memorandum, the then incoming head of OLC, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith
described it as "flawed in so many important respects that it must be withdrawn." OPR Report, supra note 3, at
85. Then Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin recalls that after he first read the Bybee Memo he
thought: "'This is insane, who wrote this?'" ld. at 92. Then Yale Law School Dean, and current State
Department Legal Adviser, Harold Koh called the Bybee Memo "perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal
opinion I have ever read." JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How THE WAR ON TERROR
BECAME AWAR ON AMERlCAN IDEALS 152 (2008).
51. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 67 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1).
52. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (2000)).
53. OPRREPORT, supra note 3, at 128-133.
54. ld. at 183 (citing NORMAN ]. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION
§53:05 (6th ed. 2000)).
55. See id. at 133.
56. I d. at 257 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3).
57. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 136.
58. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 137.
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In some instances, the Bybee Memo draws additional conclusions that are
unsupported, defining "prolonged mental harm" as severe mental pain or
suffering that must endure "for months or even years ... such as seen in mental
disorders like posttraumatic stress disorder." 59 The Memo cites no authority,
legal or otherwise, for this conclusion. 60
The Memo also ignores legal authority when it does not support a narrow
definition of what constitutes torture. In its review of United States court
decisions applying the Torture Victim Protection Act, 61 the Memorandum
focuses only on instances of physical torture, of an especially cruel and even
sadistic nature, ignoring conduct of a less extreme nature that was also found to
constitute torture. 62
The Bybee Memo also grossly mischaracterizes seminal international law
decisions, interpreting the Israeli Supreme Court's decision in PCATI v. Israe/, 63
to hold that certain interrogation techniques did not constitute torture. 64 Yet that
issue was not before the Israeli high court. The court instead held that the
interrogation techniques of violent shaking, the "frog crouch," the "shabach"
position, excessive handcuffing, hooding, and sleep deprivation were illegal; 65 it
did not attempt to define the techniques as either torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment.
Perhaps most excoriated have been the sections of the Memorandum that
address possible instances in which interrogators do in fact torture detainees. The
Bybee Memo opines that enforcement of the torture statute against interrogators
"may be barred because [doing so] would represent an unconstitutional
infringement ofthe President's authority to conduct war." 66 This view, referred to
as the "Commander in Chief' override, and predicated on an unchecked
executive power, fails to even discuss Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
the seminal case on separation of powers during wartime. 67 In addition, it ignores
the President's obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."68
Finally, the Bybee Memo states that the common law defenses of necessity and
59. !d. at 67 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at I, 46).
60. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 139.
61. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
62. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 67 (citing Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 24, 27); see also OPR
REPORT, supra note 3, at 143. Courts have found that beating of hands alone, for example, amounts to torture
under the TVPA. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996); Tachiana v. Mugabe, 234 F.
Supp. 2d 401, 420-423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 170 (D. Mass 1995) (14 hours interrogation session constitutes
torture).
63. HCJ Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's Interrogation Methods 38
I.L.M. 1471 [1999] (Isr.).
64. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 146-49.
65. 3 8 I.L.M. at 1482-84.
66. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2).
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
68. U.S. CaNST., art. II, § 3; see also OPR Report, supra note 3, at 204.
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self-defense "could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal
liability" for violations of the torture statute. 69 The memorandum provides
virtually no case law in support of its conclusions and largely ignores critical
components to the necessity defense, including imminence of threat and legal
alternatives to violating the law. 70 The opinion also fails to address Article 2.2 of
the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which provides: "No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." 71
The ratification history of CAT further supports the view that the U.S.
government understood that there were no exceptions, including the defenses of
necessity and self-defense, to the prohibition against torture. 72 This, too, was
ignored in the opinion.
Despite the solitary names in the signature blocks, these opinions and their
questionable conclusions were not crafted in isolation. Although Yoo and Bybee
(as well as the junior lawyer assigned to work with Yoo, Jennifer Koester) were
the primary drafters of the memoranda, many other lawyers in OLC, the Office of
Attorney General, and throughout the government reviewed, or were briefed on,
drafts of the opinions. A number of lawyers provided comments and edits; some
raised objections. But ultimately none objected sufficiently to prevent any of the
ultimate conclusions set forth above from becoming part of binding opinions that
approved waterboarding and other interrogation tactics.
C. SUPERVISION OF THE TORTURE MEMORANDA

A review of the process by which the torture memoranda were crafted provides
useful insights into senior government lawyers' passivity when presented with
OLC lawyers' opinions relating to the most significant constitutional, national
security, and human rights matters. This review raises questions as to what
engenders such passivity in high-level government lawyers and is the basis for
my proposal that such lawyers be tasked with clear responsibility that can be both
affirmatively structured as well as regulated.
Initial discussions shortly after Zubaydah's capture about the advice needed
included not only Yoo, who was OLC's "resident expert" on national security and
foreign policy,73 but also National Security Council Legal Adviser John
Bellinger, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Criminal Division Michael

69. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at46).
70. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 157-72.
71. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2.2,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
72. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 164-66.
73. !d. at 26.
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Chertoff, and CIA attorneys. 74 Attorney General John Ashcroft, upon being made
aware of the request, limited access to information on the matter to Attorney
General Counselor Adam Ciongoli, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson,
Bybee, and OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin. 75 Yoo took
on primary responsibility for drafting the memo, with junior attorney Koester,
who was assigned to work under him. 76 Philbin was named "second Deputy" on
the opinions, with the responsibility to review the opinions before they were
finalized. 77 Yoo and Koester produced several different draft opinions over the
course of the next four months. 78
Several government lawyers beyond OLC were either provided copies of the
memo drafts or were briefed on its content. Yoo provided the National Security
Council a copy of the memo for comment. It also appears that Yoo met with and
provided a copy of the memo to Chertoff, White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales, Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, and Counsel to the
Vice President David Addington. 79
The actions, and lack thereof, by Ashcroft and Chertoff merit special attention
here, given both their positions of authority and their particular roles in the
opinion drafting process. In mid-July, 2002, Chertoff informed the CIA that the
Criminal Division would not issue a declination to prosecute or pre-activity
pardons for CIA interrogations violating the torture statute. 80 After Chertoff
refused to provide the CIA with an advance pardon, Yoo added two new sections
to the memorandum, setting forth the Commander in Chief power to ovenide the
prohibition against torture and defenses to violations of the statute. 81
Chertoff apparently provided comments on drafts of the opinion dated as late
as July 23, 2002. 82 Yoo may have sought out Chertoff's comments after Philbin
raised concerns about the specific intent analysis. 83 Chertoff aclmowledged
receiving a copy of the memo and reading and returning it on the same day. 84
Chertoff recalls expressing some misgivings about the specific intent analysis. 85
Chertoff stressed the need for additional research about the effects of the

74. Id. at 37.
75. Id. at 39.
76. Id.
77. I d. at 39 n.41.
78. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 43 n.48, 53, 59.
79. Id. at 45-46. The memorandum was also provided to the FBI and CIA. Id. at 45.
80. Id. at 47-48.
81. Id. at 50-51. It is unclear exactly why the sections were added, though Yoo acknowledged the CIA may
have suggested to him the need to answer questions about what would happen if the CIA did in fact torture
someone "inadvertently." I d. at 51. The Vice President's counsel Addington testified that he told Yoo during a
meeting with Gonzales that he was pleased that these issues were being addressed in the memorandum. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 53, 57.
83. I d. at 57.
84. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 58.
85. I d. at 58-59.
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interrogation techniques in order to bolster a good faith defense but he did not
look "particularly closely" at the common law defenses. 86 As to the Commander
in Chief section, he recalls telling Yoo, "''m not saying I disagree, but I'm not in a
position to sign onto this." 87
With respect to the Attorney General's role, then-National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice said that she asked Ashcroft "personally to review and
confirm" the OLC opinions. 88 Yoo also stated that he briefed Ashcroft and his
counselor Ciongoli on a regular basis about the draft memoranda. 89 On July 24,
2002, Yoo informed CIA General Counsel John Rizzo that Ashcroft authorized
him to tell Rizzo that the interrogation techniques of attention grasp, walling,
facial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, and wall standing, were lawful and
could be used on Zubaydah. 90 Also in late July, Yoo gave both Ashcroft and
Ciongoli copies of the Bybee Memo but, according to Yoo, Ashcroft neither read
nor provided any comments. 91 According to Ciongoli, Ashcroft read the
Classified Bybee Memo on interrogation techniques and had "vigorous discussion" with Yoo about the opinion. 92 Ashcroft ultimately concluded that "Yoo's
position [on waterboarding] was aggressive, but defensible." 93 The Bybee Memo
and Classified Bybee Memo were shortly thereafter signed and became the
effective Executive law of the land. 94

II.

HOLDING GOVERNMENT LAWYERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR LEGAL ADVICE

The revelation of the Bybee Memo, together with the disclosure of other

86. !d. at 59.
87. !d.
88. SeeS. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY 35 (2008)
[hereinafter S. ARMED SERVICES CoMM., INQUIRY], available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/
Detainee%20Report%20Final_April% 2022%202009 .pdf.
89. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 49. Yoo also recalls advising Ashcroft that the CIA had sought assurances
that the CIA would not be prosecuted for using the proposed interrogation techniques. The number two official
in the Department of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, was apparently briefed on the Bybee
memo at some point though no other details on the nature of his awareness of the memo are known. !d. at 60 n.
59. Bybee recalls that Ashcroft never requested to see a copy of the memo. !d. at 49 n. 52.
90. !d. at 53.
91. !d. at 60.
92. !d.
93. !d.
94. This Article focuses on the roles and responsibility of senior Executive branch lawyers in relation to OLC
lawyers. Executive branch lawyers acting entirely removed from OLC could be viewed as having different
obligations with respect to neutrality. For example, as Daniel Levin said of the White House Counsel, "(P]art of
their job is to push, you know, and push as far as you can. Hopefully, not push in a ridiculous way, but they want
to make sure you're not leaving any executive power on the table." !d. at 131. However, Bruce Ackerman has
questioned the legitimacy of the Office of White House Counsel, for precisely its inherent loyalty (and lack of
objective and candid advice) to the President, and has advocated abolishing the Office. See Bruce Ackerman,
Abolish the White House Counsel, SLATE, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2216710/. Although many of
the same issues are implicated by OLC and White House Counsel, the latter office merits its own separate
analysis elsewhere.
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opmwns and the images and reports of torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo, and at CIA black sites, spurred intense interest in the responsibility
of lawyers, and condemnation of the objectivity, quality, and accuracy of the
opinions. 95 The concern over the quality and culpability of lawyers has spurred a
number of approaches that may be characterized as reform-minded, which seek
ex post or ex ante accountability in OLC.
First, people alleging harm caused by interrogation techniques authorized in
the Bybee memoranda may seek to hold lawyers responsible for these opinions
civilly liable for the harms the victims have suffered. The lawsuit, Padilla v.
Yoo, 96 offers a useful window into the potential for such lawsuits leading to
changes in OLC and holding lawyers accountable for their opinions. Second,
current and former OLC lawyers, as well as scholars, have recommended
structural changes within OLC and in other Executive agencies to prevent the
issuance of opinions lacking sufficient breadth, objectivity, and candor. 97 Finally,
some have sought professional sanctions against the lawyers involved in the
drafting of the Bybee Memo. 98 Such sanctions might entail disbarment or lesser
penalties including censure or suspension of one's license to practice law. The
OPR investigation, 99 an ultimately very public one, reflects the professional
disciplinary approach, and offers a useful example by which to examine both the
merits and flaws of this route. In addition, there have been efforts in Spain, thus
far ineffective, to hold former United States government officials, including Yoo
and Bybee, criminally liable for their role in the torture and coercive interrogation of detainees. 100 Each of these approaches may assist in ensuring greater
improvement in the quality of legal opinions, but none of them goes far enough in
fostering a sustained dialogue between lawyers at the most senior level in the
Department of Justice so that each lawyer is wrested from his passivity and held
accountable for the opinions issued by OLC.
A. CIVIL LIABILITY

Civil lawsuits may be employed to effect changes in lawyering and a firm's
infrastructure, 101 whether they are suits asserting malpractice claims or in some

95. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 27, at 162-205 (pages cited are from chapter titled "The Torture Lawyers of
Washington"); Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1578; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 91 CORNELLL. REv. 67, 120 (2005).
96. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
97. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1.
98. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
99. !d.
100. The Center for Constitutional Rights provides links to various documents connected to the Spanish
criminal investigation into U.S. torture. See "The Spanish Investigation into U.S. Torture", CENTER FOR
CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, available at http://www. ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/spanish-investigationus-torture.
101. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? 77 CORNELL L. REv. I, 38 (1991).
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cases, claims for the conduct and resulting hanns that were predicated on the
advice of lawyers. In 2008, Jose Padilla and his mother filed a lawsuit against
John Yoo, asserting Bivens claims based upon the hanns Padilla suffered while
held as an enemy combatant, including harsh interrogations, which, Padilla
alleges were "proximately and foreseeably" caused by Yoo's drafting of opinions
including the Bybee Memo and Classified Bybee Memo. 102 The district court
denied Yoo's motion to dismiss on all claims except one, for w]:lich the court
granted leave to amend. 103 Significantly, the court found that Yoo's alleged role
as a high-level government lawyer involved in policy determinations and his
alleged knowledge about Padilla's detention made Padilla's ultimate treatment,
including being subjected to harsh interrogation, a foreseeable result of Yoo's
legal advice. 104 At first blush, this might suggest that civil liability may be a good
route for holding supervisory lawyers accountable and deterring professional
misconduct. 105 However, the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. lqbal 106 has
created significant hurdles, if not made it impossible, for people to bring claims
asserting supervisory responsibility claims against federal government lawyers.
In Iqbal the Supreme Court addressed claims of the plaintiff, a Pakistani
Muslim immigrant, that a number of federal officials including Ashcroft and FBI
Director Robert Mueller crafted a policy after 9/11 that led to his detention on
account of his race, religion, and national origin and harsh conditions of
confinement in violation of the First and Fifth Amendment. 107 The Court held,
however, that the plaintiff could not bring Bivens actions based solely upon
Ashcroft's and Mueller's alleged "'knowledge and acquiescence in their
subordinates' use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions
among detainees. "' 108 Misconduct on the part of the superior must be alleged, not
simply knowledge of the subordinate's misdeed. 109
Professor Judith Resnik explains that based upon this narrowing of Bivens
claims, as well as the Court's new requirement that district courts assess the
plausibility of pleadings in a complaint, high-level government officials are

102. Complaint at 18, Padilla v. Yoo, (N.D. CaL Jan. 4, 2008), 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012-18 (N.D. CaL
2009) No. C08-00035 (JSW).
103. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
I 04. /d. at 1032-34.
105. For a fuller discussion of the challenges such a suit may face, see John Steele, Jose Padilla and his
mother sue John Yoo (fanner OLC lawyer), LEGALETHICSFORUM.COM, January 4, 2008, http:lllegalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2008/0!/jose-padilla-su.html; David Luban, Much Ado about Padilla v. Yoo, BALKINJZATJON,
Jan. 13, 2008, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/0l/much-ado-about-padilla-v-yoo.html.
106. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
107. /d. at 1942-43.
I 08. /d. at 1949 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 46).
109. /d. ("Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable
for his or her own misconduct.").
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effectively insulated from liability. 110 Justice Souter was no less sanguine about
the prospect of holding senior officials responsible for their failure to properly
supervise subordinates, stressing in his dissent: "Lest there be any mistake, in
these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is
eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely." 111
The Iqbal decision may be seen as part of a continuing retrenchment of Bivens
over the past thirty years as well as a near dissolution of means to bringing claims
in the national security context since 9/11. 112 In addition to the hurdle posed by
Iqbal, courts have generally foreclosed all Bivens claims by foreign citizens
concerning treatment suffered outside of the United States, thereby limiting the
pool of potential claimants who suffered abusive interrogations. 113 Thus the
limited prospects of holding supervisors responsible for mistreatment based upon
legal advice crafted by subordinates suggests civil liability may not be a fruitful
route for obtaining accountability and changing the legal culture in OLC.
B. CHANGES TO OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

Following the disclosure of the Bybee Memo, a group of nineteen former OLC
attorneys drafted Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel ("Guidelines")
a proposed set of guidelines for OLC. 114 Most of these suggestions concern
structural and procedural changes to the Office, based upon the view that
"regularized internal processes and mechanisms are critical to maintaining
['accurate and honest legal appraisals, unbiased by policymakers' preferred

110. See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in Honor of Henry
Monaghan, 110 CoLUM. L. REv. 579, 632 (2010). There have, however, been deviations from the expected
drumbeat of cases following Iqbal. Similar to Padilla, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois denied former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss a Bivens claim asserting
cruel and inhumane treatment. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The district court held
that two American citizens' allegations of abusive treatment in connection with their detention in Iraq and
allegations of Rumsfeld's authorization of new harsh interrogation tactics and his awareness of resulting
mistreatment of detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq constituted sufficient personal involvement to overcome the
hurdles posed by Iqbal. Id. at 963-65.
111. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting). It appears that, depending upon the purposive
involvement of the superiors and possibly the cause of action asserted, a Bivens cause of action might be
permitted by the Court.
112. See Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens after Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 255,
266-68 (2010).
113. See, e.g., In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C. 2007); Rasul v.
Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8982 (Dec. 14, 2009); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2007), vacated and rev'd, en bane, 585 F.3d 559 (2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). Indeed, in turning back Yoo's arguments that a Bivens claim should not be permitted
because foreign relations concerns or special factors were implicated, the court distinguished the allegations of
Padilla against Yoo from this line of cases because the facts in Padilla involved the treatment of an American
citizen on American soil. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1024-25, 1029-30.
114. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1576-79.
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outcomes.']" 115 A number of the Guidelines stress the importance of providing
independent advice to the Executive, though they contain internal inconsistencies, encouraging support for executive initiatives and yet counseling against
partiality.ll6
Many of these proposals advocate increased transparency, supporting both
publication of the standards governing the drafting of OLC opinions and public
disclosure of opinions. 117 Proponents contend that the "likelihood of public
disclosure will encourage both the reality and the appearance of governmental
adherence to the rule of law by deterring 'excessive claims of executive
authority.'" 118 One legislative proposal, for example, that Congress ultimately
failed to pass, the "OLC Reporting Act of 2008," required the Attorney General
to report to Congress instances in which OLC concludes that a federal statute is
unconstitutional or that a federal statute does not apply to the Executive
Branch. 119 In addition, the Guidelines encourage a greater involvement of other
affected government agencies and Justice Department divisions before providing
an opinion. 120
Unfortunately the transparency provisions are riddled with caveats. Although
the Guidelines call for public disclosure when an opinion advises that the
Executive need not adhere to a federal statutory requirement, they permit
exceptions based upon "the most compelling need for secrecy." 121 In our
post-9/11 world, an executive of any political stripe will readily assert these

115. /d. at 1595 (quoting id. at 1608). Spaulding endorses the Guidelines as well, though he harbors
skepticism that "major structural guarantees of independence" can be implemented in the Office of the Attorney
General. See Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1968-69. In order to effect structural changes, however, Spaulding
advocates making the guidelines enforceable (though he is unclear on how to do so), publicly disclosing
opinions, limiting the office's political accountability to the President, and a resolution of the tensions between
such political accountability and the lawlessness that that breeds. See id. at 1978-79. Other proposals regarding
the structure of OLC have been more combative and condemnatory, suggesting an entire revamping of the
office. For example, Professor Bruce Ackerman proposes dispensing with OLC, and establishing in its place, an
"executive tribunal." Comprised of nine ']udges for the executive branch," who serve twelve-year terms, and
must be Senate-confirmed, congressional committees would challenge proposed executive actions before the
tribunal, prior to such actions becoming law for the executive branch. See Bruce Ackerman, How to Keep
Future John Yoos under Colltrol, WASH. PosT., February 23, 20 I 0.
116. See discussion of OLC, supra at Part II.A.
117. See Guidelines, supra note 4.
118. /d.
119. SeeS. REP. No. 10-528 (2008). As might have been expected, and without a trace of irony, the OLC
opined that the proposed legislation was unconstitutional because it interferes with the President's authority
over classified information and because it impinges on confidential legal advice protected by executive
privilege. See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Att'y Gen., Re: U.S. Dep't of Justice, Constitutionality of
the OLC Reporting Act of 2008 1-4 (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/olc-reportingact.pdf.
120. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1600; see also Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DuKE J. COMP. &
lNT'L L. 389, 411 (2010) (recommending rule requiring State Department's Legal Adviser's advice on matters
concerning international law).
121. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1607.
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secrecy justifications. 122 The Guidelines similarly qualify a presumption for
disclosure, stating that there is "some legal advice that properly should remain
confidential, most notably, some advice regarding classified and some other
national security matters." 123 Thus, in matters of national security and the limits
of executive power and authority-the very areas where there have been, and
remain, the greatest potential for abuse-the Guidelines would appear to sanction
a de facto secrecy rule.
In addition to potential weaknesses in the substance of the Guidelines and
other proposals, there are concerns about their lack of enforceability. For
example, the recommendation that other government agencies and Justice
Department components be consulted in the crafting of an opinion is sound.
However, without requiring that the opinions of other agencies and components
be afforded significant weight or that those individuals bear responsibility in
some form, there is little reason to think that this proposal will change the status
quo. In fact, as the OPR account of the drafting of the memoranda reveals,
members of the CIA, FBI and National Security Council were consulted. The
Justice Department Criminal Division head, Michael Che1toff, provided comments to drafts; yet the Bybee Memo still emerged, largely unaffected by any
criticisms. The problem was not that not enough lawyers were consulted, but that
not enough of them may have felt sufficiently responsible for the underlying
opinion which they reviewed in some form or another.
C. INDIVIDUAL LAWYER PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

Notwithstanding the wide net cast by the OPR in its investigation of OLC
memoranda on interrogations, the focus was ultimately myopic, training its
attention on individual lawyers' misconduct, rather than looking more broadly,
with an eye toward the institutional and institutional leaders' actions, and, in
many cases more importantly, inaction. The OPR Report concluded that as the
person "primarily responsible" for the Bybee Memo and Classified Bybee
Memo, 124 "Yoo committed intentional professional misconduct when he violated
his duty to exercise independent legal judgment and render thorough, objective,
and candid legal advice." 125

122. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane), cert. denied
2011 U.S. LEXIS 3575(2011) (affirming dismissal of case based upon government's assertion of state secrets
privilege). Notwithstanding the Obama administration's purportedly different policies regarding state secrets,
"officials at the 'highest levels of the Department of Justice' of the new administration" determined the state
secrets privilege invoked by the Bush administration in the case was appropriate. See id. at 1078.
123. Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1607-08. The Guidelines further provide that "OLC should consider the
views regarding disclosure of the client agency that requested the advice." /d. at 1608. One envisions agencies
working on national security issues, including clandestine agencies such as the CIA, rarely favoring public
disclosure.
124. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 251.
125. /d. at 260.
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OPR also concluded that Bybee committed professional misconduct because
he recklessly disregarded "his duty to exercise independent legal judgment and
render thorough, objective, and candid legal advice." 126 OPR determined that as
"head of OLC and signator" of the memoranda, he bore personal responsibility
for providing "thorough, objective, and candid" legal advice. 127
In his review of the OPR Report, however, David Margolis reversed the
findings, determining that neither lawyer had committed professional misconduct.128 Margolis found that both Bybee and Yoo had "exercised poor judgment"
but ultimately detennined that their actions did not merit a Justice Department
referral to a state bar disciplinary authority. 129 As framed by· Margolis, the issue
was whether Yoo and Bybee fulfilled their "obligation not to provide advice to
their client that was knowingly or recklessly false or issued in bad faith, to
provide competent representation, and to explain the matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation." 130
Margolis acknowledged Yoo's own misconduct was "a close question." 131 He
criticized Yoo for espousing his extreme views on executive power in his opinion
to the detriment of his institutional client. 132 Margolis further noted that the
"memos suggest that he failed to appreciate the enormous responsibility that
comes with the authority to issue institutional decisions that carried the
authoritative weight of the Department of Justice." 133 The Bybee Memo
"consistently took an expansive view of executive authority and narrowly
construed the torture statute while often failing to expose (much less refute)
countervailing arguments and overstating the certainty of its conclusions." 134
Regarding Bybee, Margolis found that his supervisory role mitigated any finding
of misconduct, and determined that "the preponderance of the evidence does not
support a finding that he knowingly or recklessly provided incorrect advice or

126. /d. at 260. The role of Patrick Philbin is an interesting one here. See id. at 257-58. He appears to have
fulfilled his second Deputy responsibilities as envisioned, reporting his reservations up the chain of command to
Bybee, the head of OLC. Although Philbin may have walked back somewhat from his criticisms, he had
provided enough information to Bybee such that Bybee should have known that there were sufficient problems
in the memorandum that merited redress. In Goldsmith's account, it was Philbin who brought to his attention the
problems in the OLC opinions. GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 142. While Philbin may be viewed as having done
all that could be expected of him, the failure to make significant changes reflects a need for additional checks
and balances in the form of enhanced supervisory responsibility, perhaps requiring explicit articulation of the
concerns and countervailing views in the memo itself. See Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 20-21.
127. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 255.
128. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 67-68.
129. !d. at 68.
130. Jd. at 27.
131. Jd.at67.
132. ld.
133. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 67.
134. I d. at 68.
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that he exercised bad faith." 135 Notwithstanding the reversal on findings of
professional misconduct, Margolis characterized the torture memoranda as "an
unfortunate chapter in the history of the Office of Legal Counsel." 136
Notably, OPR did not find that any other lawyers who reviewed or were briefed
on the opinions committed professional misconduct. 137 Although OPR repeatedly found that Justice Department officials should have acted in response to the
opinions in various ways, it appears to have ultimately concluded that their
passivity was reasonable in light of OLC's authority to provide binding opinions.
We found Michael Chertoff, as AAG of the Criminal division, and Adam
Ciongoli, as counselor to the AG, should have recognized many of the Bybee
Memo's shortcomings and should have taken a more active role in evaluating
the CIA program. John Ashcroft, as Attorney General, was ultimately
responsible for the Bybee and Yoo Memos and for the Department's approval
of the CIA program. Ashcroft, Chertoff, Ciongoli, and others should have
looked beyond the surface complexity of the OLC memos and attempted to
verify that the analysis, assumptions, and conclusions of those documents were
sound. However, we cannot conclude that, as a matter of professional
responsibility, it was umeasonable for senior Department officials to rely on
advice from OLC. 138

Based on this line of reasoning, a senior Justice Department lawyer could
reasonably acquiesce in any and all opinions offered by OLC lawyers, never
speaking up or objecting because of the exalted station the OLC lawyer occupies.
Such reasoning is outcome determinative and ignores the interactive and social
process by which legal opinions are crafted. It is hard to understand why the
Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General-highly experienced government attorneys with particular criminal expertise-should have properly relied
on opinions of this level of consequence, particularly criminal matters, drafted
primarily by Yoo-a relatively youthful and inexperienced lawyer without any
criminal expertise.
OPR's natTowly focused findings concerning individual lawyers' professional
misconduct, to say nothing of the Margolis Memo reversing OPR's findings, may
reflect the inevitably political nature of any inquiry of government lawyers, but
also demonstrate, what is for many, the inherently limited nature of the current
state of regulation of lawyers. 139
135. !d. at 64.
136. ld. at 67.
137. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 259.
138. ld. (emphasis added). Because OPR made no findings of misconduct with respect to these senior
lawyers, Margolis did not address their roles in his memorandum.
139. Much of Margolis's criticism of the OPR Report is based upon his view that OPR relied on the more
aspirational aspects of the Best Practices memoranda and the Guidelines in finding that Yoo and Bybee
committed professional misconduct, rather than identifiable and lower standards in the D. C. Professional Rules
o.fConduct. See Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 12-13, 14-27, 68.
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A broader inquiry asks for judgments on high 1evellawyers, which is of course
politically sensitive, but it also treads upon larger policy questions, and veers
from a formalistic rule based approach to ethics to one addressing the legal
framework and the normative foundation of the legal process in OLC and the
Justice Department. Ultimately, the limited findings reveal one of the weaknesses
in the external regulation of lawyers' professional conduct, which, having been
focused on the bad man or bad lawyer, lack an aspirational or normative element,
that was found in earlier iterations of codes addressing the conduct of lawyers. 140
Specifically, scholars have complained that the OPR report and Margolis Memo
never addressed whether the OLC opinions, and not simply the Bybee Memo, but
the later opinions written by successor OLC chiefs, were correct in their analysis
of torti.Ire but instead just addressed the manner of the analysis, dodging the moral
question of torture.

III.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF REGULATION OF LAWYERS

Critics of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct argue that the Rules focus
too much on the Holmesian "bad man" and, by extension, the "bad lawyer,"
rather than articulating a more aspirational view of lawyering that had been set
forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility, and its predecessor, the Canons
of Professional Ethics. 141 The problem is that the regulation of lawyers is now
primarily a formalistic and instrumentalist inquiry rather than a normative one.
Put another way, the rules now focus only on the manner of lawyering and ignore
the substantive legal determinations. Form is elevated over substance. The
narrow focus on individual bad lawyering ignores the underlying legal issues that
may permit or even foster that singular misconduct. Practically, it remains less
than clear whether the sanctions on individual lawyers have a deterrent effect on
individual lawyers' conduct let alone the bar, a firm, or a government agency. A
more holistic approach is recommended by some, an inquiry and framework that
would also consider the collective nature of lawyering that enables such
individual conduct.
A. FORMALISM AND DETERRENCE VS. NORMS AND ASPIRATIONS

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct emerged in 1983, in large measure,
in response to criticisms of the "equivocal aspirational ambitions" and "interpretive dilemmas" in the earlier Canons' and Model Codes' ethical consider-

140. Discussed infra in Part ill.A.
141. Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CALIF. L.
REv. 1273, 1283 [hereinafter Rostain, Ethics Lost] (1998); see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism
and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 673-74 (1978); William H. Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 36-37 ( 1978).
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ations. 142 Now, some have argued, the pendulum has swung too far in the other
direction. The Model Rules eschew the early formulations of legal ethics for a
perceived more simple approach. 143 In so doing, critics contend, the adoption of
the Model Rules lead to greater reliance on external agency regulation and a focus
on disincentives to overcome lawyers' acting in their own self-interest. 144 This
sort of regulation of the legal profession will meet only middling success,
however, because it lacks a "nonnative foundation that ties law practice to
broader collective values." 145
Professor Tanina Rostain argues that current regulation of lawyers adheres too
closely to a behavioral economics polestar. The behavioral economics model
posits that lawyers will advocate for their clients in unscrupulous fashion because
it is in their economic self-interest to do so. 146 Lawyers will craft whatever murky
legal arguments are needed in support of their clients' objectives, in pursuit of
financial reward, but under the guise of zealous advocacy. Only by punishing,
and thereby disincentivizing, overzealous advocacy will the misconduct be
deterred.
Rostain criticizes the regulation of lawyers tethered to a behavioral economics
model as both unrealistic and undesirable. Rostain contends that first, "people
obey laws not primarily because they fear sanctions but because they have
internalized commitments to legal institutions and values." 147 Second, a set of
rules predicated on legal representation of the "bad man" and that promote
"neutral partisanship" lacks a normative foundation. 148 Rostain does not despair
of any and all utility of the regulation of lawyers; the focus on rules should,
however, "reflect and communicate a collective understanding of the appropriate
parameters of professional relationships, separate from how frequently or rarely
they are enforced." 149 Thus rules may embody and inculcate infrastructural
changes and norms, facilitating at once aspirational and deterrent objectives.
What constitutes a normative foundation remains a hotly contested terrain.
What should govern situations confronting any lawyer, let alone an OLC lawyer
and her supervisors? Luban has asserted that an individual's morality must orient
the lawyer's decisions, contending, for example, "Lawyers should approach laws
defending basic human dignity with fear and trembling." 150 A number of scholars

142. See STEPHEN G!LLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYER: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 10 (8th ed. 2009);
Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1292-1303.
143. !d. at 1302-03.
144. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 31,44-53 (1995); Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra, note 141, at 1299.
145. Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1302-03.
146. ld. at 1276-77, 1302-03.
147. ld. at 1303.
148. ld. at 1312-13.
149. Tanina Rostain, Partners and Power: The Role of Law Finn Organizational Factors in Attorney
Misconduct, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281, 287 [Hereinafter Rostain, Partners and Power] (2006).
150. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 205.
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have criticized Luban's privileging of individual morality in these situations,
raising concerns over subjectivity, moral pluralism and suggesting he unjustifiably disregards the values of the legal and political systems. Is I In the end, one
fears, we are simply left in an unsatisfying, "'lonely subjective world' of inchoate
personal value."I 52 The discomfort with establishing individual morality as a
normative foundation for lawyering is understandable. Yet a norm offealty to the
client owing to professional obligation, tempered only by a sLrict Model Rules of
Professional Conduct-based consciousness and occasional regulation is not a
sufficient normative foundation either.
Luban's approach is more nuanced than his critics would acknowledge. Luban
does not simply insist that individual morality should trump professional
obligations in all instances. Rather, he insists that by requiring "moral activism"
on the part of lawyers, lawyers cannot defend all of their conduct based simply on
their obligations to the client when confronting legal ethical questions. 153 Facing
exceptional circumstances, in particular, lawyers must weigh their own morality
against their "professional role morality," i.e., their obligations to the client. I5 4
Though verging on the metaphysical for some, Luban's approach is especially
salient for the OLC attorney. More than most lawyers, the OLC lawyer faces
significant pressure to realize his client's objective; the client is, after all, the
President, and the advice sought is of national import, often relating to national
security. Moreover, the questions frequently entail very difficult ethical questions, like whether particular interrogation techniques constitute torture. Many
times, the legal answers are not clear and are mixed with questions of policy.
Former lawyers from OLC insist that there is an institutional culture and sense
of integrity at the office that serves as normative foundation, which will generally
withstand the potential pressures associated with having a President as client. Iss
But they aclmowledge and endorse the need to serve the client, suggesting that
the fealty to the client may at times tip the balance in favor of deference to the
Executive's preferred course of action. In addition, in a post-9/11 world, there
151. An extensive discussion and debate over Luban's emphasis on the individual lawyer's conscience over
the institutional system's values may be found in a colloquium on Luban's LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY.
See Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1311 (2008); Katherine R. Kruse, The Human
Dignity of Clients, 93 CORNELLL. REv.l343 (2008); William H. Simon, The Past, Present, and Future of Legal
Ethics: Three Comments for David Luban, 93 CORNELLL. REv. 1365 (2008); Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of
Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1377 (2008); W. Bradley Wendel,
Legal Ethics as "Political Moralism" or the Morality of Politics, 93 CoRNELL L. REv. 1413 (2008). Goldsmith
also would consider this invitation to moral inquiry an improper expansion of OLC's brief. GoLDSMITH, supra
note 5, at 147-48 ("OLC's ultimate responsibility is to provide information about legality, regardless of what
morality may indicate, and even if harm may result.").
152. Rostain, Ethics Last, supra note 141, at 1298 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and
Professional Ethics, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 133, 140 (1992)).
153. David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1437,
1444-45 (2008).
154. /d. at 1445.
155. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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may also be an inclination on the part of OLC to provide the Executive Branch
client what it wants, out of a fear of otherwise being perceived as risk-averse. 156
Should the OLC counsel against the client's desired course of action too often,
the client may stop seeking its legal advice. What may be the only thing standing
in the way of giving the President exactly what he wants are OLC lawyers' own
morality. 157
B. REGULATION OF OLC OPINION AUTHORS AND SUPERVISORS

The OPR Report and Margolis Memorandum's failure to address the
soundness of the opinions' conclusions, for example, whether it was correct to
conclude that Congress could not prohibit the President from ordering torture,
reflects the absence of a normative foundation in current regulation of lawyers. It
also explains, in part, why succeeding OLC opinions on interrogation and their
authors were not subject to the same criticism by OPR.
With respect to the scope of inquiry, OPR made clear its purely instrumentalist
approach: "We did not attempt to determine and did not base our findings on
whether the Bybee and Yoo Memos arrived at a conect result." 158 Or, as Margolis
put it, "OPR found Yoo and Bybee to have engaged in misconduct not because
they were wrong, but because they were not thorough." 159 This limited focus
intentionally misses the bigger picture. 160
Later OLC opinions, intended to supersede the Bybee Memo, did not arrive at
different- conclusions, yet they largely escaped criticism. For example, then
Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin authored a replacement memo
(the "Levin Memo") on December 30, 2004, characterizing the Bybee Memo's
discussion of the President's commander in chief power and defenses to liability
as "unnecessary" and "inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive
that United States personnel not engage in torture." 161 The Levin Memo also
modified the Bybee Memo's analysis of "severe pain," expanding it to include
pain beyond only that associated with "organ failure." 162 However, in a footnote,

!56. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 91-98, 163-64 (discussing risk-averse effect of legal opinions on
intelligence operations).
157. Psychologists studying impulses toward obedience similarly suggest locating an alternative source of
authority in order to resist automatic obedience, such as one's "religious, spiritual, political, or philosophical
commitments." PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKlNG, AND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 556 (20 10) (citing PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO &
MARK R. LIEPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 75 ( 1991 )).
158. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 160.
159. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 21.
160. See David Cole, They Did Authorize Torture, But ... , THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, AprilS, 2010,
at 42 ("In a more ti.mdamental sense, however, both the OPR Report and Margolis failed to confront the real
wrong at issue. They focused exclusively on the manner by which Yoo and Bybee arrived at their result, rather
than the result itself.").
161. Levin Memorandum, supra note 50, at 2.
162. /d.
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the Levin Memo noted that notwithstanding the disagreements with the Bybee
Memo's analysis of legal standards, the conclusions themselves would not be
disturbed. 163 In other words, all interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, were still legal.
Luban suggests that the Levin Memo escaped the same criticism and judgment
only because it "sounded more moderate than Bybee." 164 But in fact, "the Levin
memo makes only minimum cosmetic changes to the bits of Bybee that drew the
worst publicity." 165 Luban further contends that succeeding opinions also failed
to provide objective analyses and instead were, rather, "aggressive advocacy
briefs" intended to support the CIA interrogation regime. 166
Professor David Cole explains OPR's agnostic approach to the issue of torture
as a means of avoiding a collective indictment. Addressing "the legality of the
brutality itself ... would have implicated not only John Yoo and Jay Bybee, but
all of the lawyers who approved these methods over the five-year course of their
application." 167 That finding would have simply been too politically fraught. 168
Moreover, a finding of illegality would have raised questions about the
interrogation program itself and CIA interrogators' reliance on the memoranda
and their potential culpability for actions taken based upon the legal opinions. 169
What these outcomes reflect then are the limits of the current legal regulatory
framework, which permits even external regulators to avoid making findings
when confronted by certain political pressures.
It is this Article's contention, however, that the professional responsibility
project should be reoriented in its application to OLC. Application of professional rules to OLC should examine the collective legal process that is
responsible for the misconduct, which necessarily requires an inquiry into

163. ld. at 2 n. 8.
164. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 180.
165. /d. For a contrary opinion on the positive impact and changes made by the Levin Memo, see
GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 144-51, 163-65, in which he explains the decision to withdraw the Bybee Memo.
Goldsmith indicates that his primary concern regarding the opinions was that the overbroad arguments could be
employed to justify "much more aggressive" interrogations than the ones specifically authorized. Id. at I 5 I. The
Levin Memo's changes should have dispelled at least that possibility.
166. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 198.
167. Cole, supra note 160, at 42.
168. Oddly enough, Yoo and Bybee have in many ways become the "scapegoats" of the torture memoranda.
It is they, and they alone, according to the OPR Report, and, it would seem, the popular narrative, who bear
responsibility for any misconduct that Jed to the crafting of the opinions authorizing waterboarding and other
interrogation techniques. They are the proverbial "bad apples."
169. The reliance of the intelligence community and CIA operatives on the OLC's opinions bedeviled
Goldsmith as he contemplated withdrawing the Bybee Memo, and the ultimate withdrawal apparently affected
intelligence gathering due to ambiguity over the legal analysis. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 152, 163-65.
Notwithstanding the Obama administration's withdrawal of many Bush-era OLC opinions on interrogation,
Attorney General Eric Holder addressed these same concerns of criminal culpability, stating that the Justice
Department would "'not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance
given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees.'" Mark Mazzetti & Charlie
Savage, No Criminal Charges Sought over CIA Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, November 9, 2009.
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supervisors' responsibility for the opinions and a discussion of underlying OLC
norms. 170 This collective analysis is particularly necessary in the case of OLC,
which renders opinions that not only have the force of law but authorize policies
of national and international import. Limiting ethics reviews of OLC opinions to
an instrumental analysis of simply the drafters' manner of analysis ignores the
very real effect that these legal opinions have in the world. A properly formulated
conception of reasonable supervision of OLC opinions demands greater accountability for high-level lawyers. Such accountability will compel a discussion
between lawyers of the normative foundations of tbe drafting of the opinions, and
a confrontation with the memorandum's real world consequences.

IV.

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY AS A BRIDGE FROM SIMPLE RULE
ENFORCEMENT TO STRUCTURAL, NORM GENERATION

The idea of supervisory responsibility arises from, what would seem, tbe
uncontroversial position that every case of professional discipline raises the
question of reasonable supervision. 171 A lawyer's misconduct simply precipitates
the logical inquiry: who was his boss? What was she doing while the subordinate
lawyer acted unethically? This relatively simple concept recognizes that, outside
of the solo-legal practice, no lawyer is an island. The Restatement on the Law
Governing Lawyers, in its articulation of the rules on supervision of lawyers,
observes that lawyers in law firms, law departments of corporations, and
government agencies do not "operate as free agents in their work relating to the
representation of clients." 172 In essence, this is simply the "general principle of
personal responsibility for acts of another." 173
The Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1 on "Responsibilities of Partners,
Managers, And Supervisory Lawyers," provides in its entirety:
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct if:

170. See Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1337-38.
171. Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 10
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 259, 285 (1994).
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: SUPERVISION OF LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS
WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION (2000) (Introductory Note) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
173. MODEL RULES R. 5.1 cmt. 4.
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(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law
firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority
over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial
action. 174

Sections (a) and (b) of Rule 5.1 detail the duties of supervisory lawyers to both
craft general firm or law department practices and policies that ensure ethical
conduct by all lawyers and take specific actions to ensure ethical conduct when
directly overseeing a lawyer's work. The drafters of Rule 5.1 did not, however,
intend to establish a form of vicarious liability that imputes liability based upon
the subordinate lawyer's misconduct. 175 Rather, these sections establish an
"independent duty of reasonable supervision in Rule 5.1 [that] is affirmative and
absolute; the failure to provide such reasonable supervision constitutes the
lawyer's own independent violation which is the unethical conduct warranting
professional discipline." 176
Section (c)(l) of Rule 5.1 sets forth what has been characterized as a form of
"accessorial liability" for a lawyer who ratifies or orders her subordinates'
misconduct. 177 Section (c)(2) creates a "duty to rectify" misconduct when a
supervisor learns of it and the consequences of which can be prevented or
minimized. 178 Concerning the latter, the extent of the supervisor's remedial
obligation depends upon the "immediacy" of his "involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct." 179 The supervisor must take whatever steps are required
to preclude "avoidable consequences" of the wrongdoing. 180
Both subsections of 5.1(c) predicate a supervising lawyer's responsibility on
knowledge of the misconduct. Under the model rules, knowledge is defined as
"actual knowledge of the fact in question," 181 though, "[a] person's knowledge
may be inferred from circumstances." 182 In addition, the drafting history of Rule
5.1(c)(l) makes clear that the drafters "intended to remove any possibility of

174. MoDEL RULES R. 5.1. Section 11 of The (Third) Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, supra note
172, provides essentially the same responsibilities for a supervising lawyer that are provided in Model Rule 5.1,
though it includes the responsibilities as they also relate to non-lawyers, which are set forth in Model Rule 5.3.
175. Miller, supra note 171, at 276-77; see supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text for useful discussion of
resistance to holding supervising lawyers vicariously responsible for other lawyers.
176. Miller, supra note 171, at 277-78.
177. RESTPJ"EMENT, supra note 172, at§ II cmt. e (discussing sec. 3(a), equivalent of 5.1(c)(l )).
178. Miller, supra note 171, at 278 n. 86 (acknowledging the relationship between the prevention function in
Rule 5.1(a) and (b) and the curative function of Rule 5.1(c)).
179. MoDEL RULES R. 5.1, cmt. 5.
180. MoDEL RULES R. 5.1, cmt. 5.
181. MoDEL RULES R. l.O(f).
182. MoDEL RULES R. l.O(f).
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supervisory responsibility being imposed on a lawyer who had no knowledge of
specific conduct." 183
However, a discernible "knowledge creep" has been noted in the way ethics
committees and courts have interpreted this requirement. 184 Courts and regulatory authorities have been loathe to find a lack of knowledge when supervising
lawyers have not complied with their affirmative and preventive obligations
under 5.1(a) and (b); if a lawyer fails to take the necessary steps to prevent
misconduct, he cannot subsequently claim ignorance when the misconduct in fact
occurs. 185 Similarly, the Restatement commentary explains that "[l]ack of
awareness of misconduct" does not excuse a supervising lawyer who has not
taken "reasonable measures" to ensure the subordinate's compliance with
professional standards. 186 For example, a federal district court held in addressing
Rule 5.3(c), the analogous rule for supervision of non-lawyers, that a supervising
lawyer "without actual knowledge of' a paralegal's misconduct is "responsible
for the conduct where the attorney would have known about the conduct but for
the attorney's negligence or recklessness." 187 To some extent, these cases and
opinions hold that a supervising· lawyer can be said to have constructive
knowledge of misconduct, and therefore be obligated to remedy consequences of
that conduct. 188 Only two jurisdictions-New York and the District of Columbiahave explicitly embraced this constructive knowledge standard in their mles,
holding a managing and supervising lawyer responsible for another lawyer's
misconduct not simply when the supervisor knows of misconduct but also when
she should knovv of the improper actions. 189
Rule 5.2, which governs a subordinate's responsibility, supports the notion that
supervisors should take a more active role in deliberations of close matters. Rule
5 .2(b) provides: "A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable

183. Miller, supra note 171, at 276 n.79 (quoting E. REICH, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 153-54 (1987)).
184. Arthur J. Lachman, What You Should Know Can Hurt You: Management and Supen,isory Responsibility for the Misconduct of Others under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3, 18 ABA PROF. LAW. 1 (2007) (discussing cases
and ABA ethics opinions).
185. !d.
186. RESTATEMENT, supra note 172, at § ll, cmt. c.
187. Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 n.4 (W.D.Wa. 2001).
188. See id. at 1203; Lachman, supra note 184, at l. Constructive knowledge is defined as ["k]nowledge that
one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at 888 (4th ed. 2004). Adoption of this more expansive definition of knowledge
differs from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which defines knowledge as "actual knowledge of the
fact in question." MODEL RULES R. l.O(f). However, the definition allows that "[a] person's knowledge may be
inferred from circumstances." MODEL RULES R. l.O(f).
189. See N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(d)(2)(ii) (holding supervising or managing lawyer responsible for a lawyer's
misconduct, if the superior "in the exercise of reasonable management or supervisory authority should have
lrnown of the conduct."); D.C. R.P.C. 5.l(c)(2) (holding supervising or managing lawyer responsible for a
lawyer's misconduct if the superior "reasonably should know of the conduct").
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resolution of an arguable question of professional duty." 190 In fact, the conunent
to the Rule suggests, in instances entailing a close question, that it is the
supervisor who should decide the course of action. 191 The Rule thus encourages
subordinate lawyers to consult superiors on close questions of law and places the
onus on the superior to resolve the matter. Where the question is not a close one
but would clearly constitute a violation of legal ethics,- a subordinate cannot seek
to excuse his or her conduct by having relied on a superior's order or approval. 192
Significantly, Rule 5.1 has rarely been enforced, particularly against large law
firm practices. 193 Professor Ted Schneyer attributes the infrequency of disciplinary proceedings against large law firm lawyers to (1) the difficulty in assigning
blame to particular individual lawyers because of the nature of collective effort in
legal work; 194 (2) the reluctance to scapegoat individual lawyers when any
lawyer in that position might have done the same thing; 195 and (3) the "ethical
infrastructure" of the firm itself, which "may have at least as much to do with
causing and avoiding unjustified hann as do the individual values and practice
skills of their lawyers." 196
Based in part on these explanations for lax enforcement of regulations
conceming supervisors' individual responsibility, Schneyer proposed a collective
finn obligation and responsibility, modeled on the concept of corporate criminal
responsibility. 197 Corporate liability is premised, in part, upon the idea that if only
individuals are held liable, "owners will often have no incentive to prevent,
detect, or remedy such crimes." 198 But if the corporation is instead punished and
its profits diminished, owners will be incentivized to deter the unlawful
behavior. 199
A variation of Schneyer's concept of general firm responsibility may be found
in Professor Irwin Miller's proposal to "expand[] the ethical duty of reasonable
supervision to the firm, the breach of which constitutes the finn's independent
violation justifying discipline." 200 While sharing the same objective to address a
firm's responsibility for supervision of lawyers' conduct, this approach may be
190. MODEL RULES R. 5.2(b).
191. MoDEL RULES R. 5.2 cmt. 2.
192. MoDEL RULES R. 5.2(a). The rule removes the possibility of a junior lawyer invoking a "Nuremberg
defense" in the disciplinary process.
193. See Schneyer, supra note 101, at I; Lachman, supra note 184, at 1.
194. Schneyer, supra note 101, at 9.
195. /d. at 10.
196. /d. Rostain has suggested that 5.1 (a), the requirement that supervising lawyers "make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to
the rules of professional conduct," "is largely unenforceable because it is difficult and likely to be perceived as
unfair to hold specific individuals responsible for the structural defects of the organization." Rostain, Partners
and Power, supra note 149, at 282 n.3.
197. Schneyer, supra note 101, at 12.
198. !d. at 25.
199. /d.
200. Miller, supra note 171, at 305.
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more palatable given its less expansive reach and the general hostility toward a
disciplinary rule that would hold a firm or law department vicariously liable for
lawyers' rnisconduct. 201 Notably, New York and New Jersey are alone among the
states to adopt this approach in their variations of Rule 5.1, holding firms, not
simply managing and supervising attorneys, responsible for taking affirmative
steps to ensure that lawyers in a firm conform to professional rules. 202
In order to deter misconduct by a firm or law department and its individual
lawyers, an expanded conception of lawyer responsibility is required. First, the
firm or law department should be held responsible for supervision. Second,
managing and supervising lawyers must be held to a constructive knowledge
standard which imposes liability on them for their subordinates' misconduct if
they knew, had reason to know, or should have known about the misconduct and
failed to prevent the misconduct or rectify its effects?03 Such a rule has the great
advantage of prescribing "the parameters of lawyers' professional relationships
in their workplaces," regardless of enforcement. 204 This sort of rule fosters an
ethical infrastructure in a firm or law department in which superiors cannot
ignore or avoid ultimate decisions or render plausible denials of responsibility
and knowledge of conduct. 205

V. A SPECIALIZED RULE 5.1

FOR THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

This Article argues that the dictates of Model Rule 5.1 do not sufficiently
address supervision of OLC legal opinions. Rather, a new mle governing
supervision of OLC lawyers should be adopted that includes four key elements:
( 1) enforceable mles that facilitate compliance with professional mles and
establish a normative framework for the office, including the duty to provide
independent advice; (2) structural changes to the OLC, including a two-year
limitation on the tenure of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the office,
the creation of an OLC ethics adviser, and a requirement that the Attorney
General sign particular opinions; (3) a constructive knowledge standard; and
(4) a broad definition of supervisor, which includes Justice Department component chiefs and Executive agency legal advisers, and a requirement that the
relevant supervisors be consulted for legal advice. In addition, building upon the
comments to Model Rule 5.1, a supervisor may be obligated to take more

201. !d.
202. N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(a); N.J. R.P.C. 5.1(a). See also N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(c) (New York also holds law firms
responsible for properly supervising lawyers).
203. New York is the only jurisdiction that has adopted both of these elements-the more expansive
definition of knowledge or duty to know and entity or firm responsibility. See N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1.
204. Rostain, Partners and Power, supra note 149, at 287.
205. Lachman, supra note 184, at 6 ("Absent imposition of a constructive knowledge standard under
subsection (c)(2) of Rules 5.1 and 5.3, supervisors and managers practicing in a firm environment have an
incentive simply not to 'know."').
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significant steps aimed at curbing the misconduct when the matter concerns a
potential violation of law. 206 Also, based upon Model Rule 5.2, when an issue of
professional judgment about an ethical duty arises in the course of crafting an
opinion, the supervisor should be responsible for making the judgment.
Whether the supervising lawyer is within OLC, another Justice Department
component, or another Executive agency, steps to rectify misconduct must
include bringing concerns to the attention of officials as high as the Attorney
General. 207 A duty to rectify misconduct is not mitigated by the fact that the work
constitutes an OLC Opinion. As a supervising lawyer, whose duties may include
reviewing and commenting on the opinion, he or she may not be "bound" by the
opinion. Otherwise the delegation of authority to OLC amounts to an unacceptable abdication of responsibility by senior Executive lawyers. 208
The proposed rule seeks to exemplify Judge James E. Baker's description of
executive process in national security law. As Balcer explains, "[p]rocess
identifies the official responsible for the decision and for the outcome, as well as
the criteria to measure effect. Without such legal process, national security
decision-making might be all speed, secrecy, and silence." 209 In contrast to the
torture memoranda writing process, the proposed rule would ensure a more
inclusive process that involves a diversity of experts and "critical views and
facts," and provide more legitimacy to the opinions by requiring that they be
signed off by politically accountable actors.Z 10
A. RULES ESTABLISHING NORMS AND COMPLIANCE WITH PROFESSIONAL
RULES AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES

The first element of the proposed rule requires that affirmative steps be taken to
craft a culture of reasonable supervision within the Office. A set of norms must be
articulated to govern and provide for independent legal advice. Much of the work
here has been articulated in the OLC Guidelines and Best Practices memoranda,
though there remain some internal inconsistencies, as discussed above, that

206. Similarly, OPR considered the nature of the subject in its assessment of Bybee's responsibility,
observing "this was not a routine project that simply required Bybee to sign off as an administrative matter."
OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 256-57. The seriousness of the subject-torture-and the extreme legal
positions-prosecution as an infringement of Presidential power-merit a broader view of responsibility and an
obligation to correct the misconduct.
207. The obligation to "report up" the chain of command other government lawyers' misconduct is also
consistent with, and may be compelled by, MoDEL RULES R. !.13(b) ("Unless the lawyer reasonably believes
that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher
authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act
on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law."). See also MoDEL RULES R. 1.13(b) at cmt. 9
(noting applicability of MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 to governmental organizations).
208. See Miller, supra note 171, at 277 n.80 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Finn Culture Sets the Tone on
Behavior, NAT'LL.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 15, 18).
209. BAKER, supra note 29, at 24.
210. !d. at 24-25.
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should be addressed to make clear that adherence to independence and
objectivity trumps loyalty to the Executive client. 211
Second, these rules should be made enforceable, or, at least buttressed, through
the insertion of a pern1anent ethics advisor within OLC. Lawyers who are
uncertain about particular assignments, analyses, or other potential misconduct
may notify the adviser. The adviser would serve as a knowledgeable and
independent check on OLC lawyers' impulses toward approving Executive
Branch positions, an approach recommended by psychologists for resisting
reflexive obedience? 12 The adviser would also be authorized to audit OLC legal
opinions, reviewing completed, but undisclosed memoranda for their legal
ethical compliance.
The ethics advisor should be an OLC lawyer, at the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General level, in order to ensure greater deference to that lawyer's views. Such
insertion within OLC is necessary because federal regulations provide that OPR's
findings cannot affect the functions or override the authority of OLC.Z 13
Cunently, Justice Department employees have a regulation prescribed duty to
report to their supervisor or to OPR allegations of misconduct by DOJ attorneys,
which includes legal advice.Z 14 Supervisors may also be required to report the
misconduct to OPR as well or to a higher ranking official. 215
Third, the Assistant Attorney General may only serve as head of OLC for two
years. After completion of a two-year term, the President must appoint a new
chief for the office, requiring Senate confirmation. A transition at the top of the
office ensures that another powerfully vested set of eyes within one particular
administration reviews and evaluates the substance and quality of legal opinions
issued by the office. The example of Jack Goldsmith, as an incoming,
mid-administration OLC chief, and his withdrawal of particular OLC opinions,
illustrates the salutary effects of imposing an internal check in the OLC opinion
process. 216 Goldsmith's dispassionate and critical approach to the memoranda
may be explained, in part, by the fact that he came on board as head of OLC after
the opinions had been written. This retroactive examination of legal analysis
ensures that poor legal advice is at least conected, even if after the initial basis for
the analysis and opinion, limiting, at least, the precedential effect of such
opinions. In addition, the Senate confirmation process affords an external check
on the OLC opinion process, facilitating some legislative scrutiny of OLC as

211. See supra Part II.B; Part liLA.
212. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 157, at 556 (citing PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MARK R. LIEPE, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 75 ( 1991) ).
213. 28 C.F.R. § 0.129 (2005).
214. 28 C.F.R. § 45.12 (2006); U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL [Hereinafter USAM], 1-400, Allegations of
Misconduct by Department of Justice Employees-Reporting Misconduct Allegations.
215. USAM, supra note 214.
216. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 141-172 (describing his review of, and decision to withdraw, the Bybee
Memorandum and Classified Bybee Memorandum).
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well. 217
Finally, formal opinions determining that laws may not constrain executive
action or that authorize significant deviations in government policies must be
signed off on by the Attorney General and not simply by the Assistant Attorney
General for OLC. This formal allocation of responsibility to the most senior
Justice Department official recognizes the policy implications of legal opinions;
decisions of great political consequence must be made by public figures who
have been vetted by Congress, and who are therefore politically fu!d publicly
accountable. 218 The designation of signing authority may be viewed by some as
going beyond supervisory responsibility, and holding the Attorney General
personally responsible because he is now "actively engaged in promoting
conduct that may violate at least the spirit of existing law," 219 or directing
changes in government policies. At the very least, the signature requirement
makes abundantly clear that the Attorney General is ordering or ratifying the
suspect conduct and should therefore be viewed as a supervisor under any
iteration of Model Rule 5.1(c)(l).
B. CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE

The constructive knowledge standard is critical to ensuring that OLC's
ultimately binding and often secret legal opinions are rigorously vetted. As
discussed above, variants of this standard have already been introduced into the
New York and District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct. 220 The
similar concept of willful blindness has been recognized in American law in a
variety of criminal and civil contexts dating back to the late-nineteenth
century. 221 The constructive knowledge standard also has roots in the doctrine of
command responsibility, under which superiors may be held responsible for war
crimes committed by their subordinates.Z22

217. Another, but less likely politically palatable approach might be to require that OLC heads serve terms
that are not aligned with a particular administration. Thus the OLC head could, for example, be appointed by the
President to serve seven or fourteen year terms, similar to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. The
OLC chief might then be less likely to over identify with the client and be more inclined to say no. For a
contrasting view, and a generally supportive view of OLC fealty to precedent, see Morrison, supra note 13.
218. The formal signature requirement will also preclude future Attorneys General from claiming ignorance
as a defense, a fairly implausible claim that Ashcroft has propounded. See Yoo, supra note 30, at 186-87.
219. Zacharias, supra note 29, at 360.
220. See supra Part IV, discussing N.Y. R.P.C. 5.1(d)(2)(ii) and D.C. R.P.C. 5.1(c)(2).
221. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 U.S.2060, 2068-69 (2011) (holding that the
doctrine of willful blindness applies in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b)).
The willful blindness doctrine precludes individuals from evading statutory knowledge or willfulness
requirements by intentionally keeping from themselves evidence of wrongdoing. !d.
222. The United States Supreme Court approved the doctrine of command responsibility in In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1946), upholding a military tribunal's charges against a Japanese general for breaching his
duty "to control the operations of the members of his command by 'permitting them to commit' the extensive
and widespread atrocities specified." Nazi officials were also prosecuted under the doctrine. See, e.g., Case No.
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Under the proposed rule, superiors shall be prompted to engage in a dialogue
of greater meaning with the subordinate lawyer because they may be held
accountable for the opinions. When senior lawyers are provided with draft
opinions concerning their areas of expertise or specialization, 223 they may be
viewed as supervisors and their actions should therefore be analyzed under a
standard that asks what they knew, had reason to know, or should have known
concerning flaws in the opinion?24 In addition, a supervisor should show the
opinion to lawyers with relevant expertise, even if outside of OLC. 225 Supervisors must then take steps to correct the flaws and mitigate any consequences of
the flawed legal reasoning. Supervisors may be sanctioned for the same
misconduct that their subordinates may be punished for in connection with
opinions. In addition, they can be sanctioned for failing to properly supervise the

47: The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, 8 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 34 (1949). More recently, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 codified the doctrine,
providing:
Any person is punishable as a principal under this chapter who is a superior commander who, with
regard to acts punishable under this chapter, knew, had reason to know, or should have known, that a
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
§ 950q(3), Title XVill of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L. 111-84, 123
Stat. 2190, enacted October 28, 2009). International treaties have codified the doctrine as well. See Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.
3217th mtg., at art. 7(3) U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993), reprillted in 32 I.L.M. 192, http://www. icty.org/x/file/
Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf (holding superior criminally responsible for subordinate's
violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity "if he knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, at art. 28, U.N. Doc. NConf. 183/9 (1998), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/
romefra.htm (providing criminal responsibility for a military commander or person who "(i) either knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit
such crimes; and (ii) ***failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent
or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution."). For an excellent discussion of command responsibility, see Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S.
Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Emerprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 120-31 (2005).
223. See infra Part V.C; see also Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1600 (recommending that OLC involve
relevant government agencies and Department of Justice components in drafting legal opinions); Scharf, supra
note 120, at 4ll (proposing that OLC seek opinion from State Department Legal Adviser on international law
matters).
224. Interestingly, it would appear that OPR, in its assessment of Bybee's responsibility, employed the duty
to know standard found in the D.C. Professional Rules of Conduct and concluded that he "should have known"
or "should have questioned and recognized" flaws in Yoo's reasoning. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 256-57.
Nowhere, however, is Rule 5.1 invoked, and this analysis seems to have been folded into an assessment of
Bybee's personal responsibility. In contrast, Margolis treated Bybee's role as a supervisor as a mitigating factor
in his analysis of Bybee's responsibility. Margolis Memorandum, supra note 3, at 100. As noted earlier, see
supra Part II.C., OPR also determined senior lawyers including Ashcroft and Chertoff, should have known
about certain errors and should have acted, yet did not address whether they had violated Rule 5.1.
225. See GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 167 (observing that failure to share opinion with others, in particular
the State Department, "was done to control outcomes in the opinions and minimize resistance to them").
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subordinate lawyer.
Without a constructive knowledge standard, supervisors of OLC lawyers have
less motivation to learn of any weaknesses in the opinions, and would, therefore,
have less reason to correct deficiencies? 26 That may well explain what occurred
with the torture memoranda. As Goldsmith has criticized the manner in which the
opinions were crafted, Yoo's superiors-Bybee, Ashcroft, and the White
House-failed to supervise him because they liked the answers and they deferred
to his purported expertise in internationallaw?27
A superior, high-level lawyer's desire, or sympathy, for a certain policy or
programmatic outcome-liking the answers-need not, however, result in
automatic acceptance of the legal opinion, though the internal and external
pressures to accede to the reasoning may be great. Goldmsith's legal analysis and
reevaluation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program after he arrived at OLC, and
the resulting change of view as to the program's legality by Justice Department
officials, including Attorney General Ashcroft and Director of the FBI Robert
Mueller, demonstrate that political appointee lawyers can be swayed by correct
and independent legal analysis. 228
The surveillance program was already a signature part of counterterrorism
efforts when Goldsmith raised questions about the underlying legal bases for the
program?29 In fact, the program had been renewed on a regular basis by the
Justice Department, with the Attorney General certifying to its legality? 30 Yet
when Goldsmith questioned the legal opinions supporting the program, an
official as high as Ashcroft ultimately recognized the flaws in the opinions and

226. There is, of course, a practical concern that superiors should not have to be involved at every level of
production of opinions and know every bit of minutiae within them. That is fair; the duty to know need not apply
to minutiae and marginalia. Presumably, such matters would not be the basis for ethical misconduct charges.
227. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 169. Undoubtedly, the role of "groupthink" also explains the lack of any
significant objections to the torture memoranda. Groupthink is "'a mode of thinking that people engage in when
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."' Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to
Unethical Behavior in Organizations, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS 11:651, 653 (1992) (quoting IRVING L.
JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: APSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1972)).
Ahallmark of groupthink is an internal pressure to achieve consensus resulting in selective biases that ignore
countervailing views. MARGARET HEFFERNAN, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: WHY WE IGNORE THE OBVIOUS Kr OUR PERIL
137 (2011). To be sure the pressure to approve torture and other extreme interrogation techniques was
significant, and the legitimacy and efficacy of torture unquestioned by many policymakers and high-level
lawyers at the time of the memoranda's crafting. See, e.g., President Bush Speech, supra note 45; JAMES RISEN,
STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BusH ADMINISTRATION 22-27 (2006).
228. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 177-82; Hearing on U.S. Attomey Firings Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., IlOth Cong. (2007) (statement of James B. Corney, Former Dep. Att'y Gen) available at
http://gulcfac .typepad .corn!georgetown_university_1 awI files/comey. transcript. pdf.
229. GoLDSMITH, supra note 5, at 182.
230. Hearing on U.S. Attorney Firings Before the Senate Judicimy Comm., 11 Oth Con g. (2007) (statement of
James B. Corney, Former Dep. Att'y Gen) available at http://gulcfac.typepad.corn!georgetown_university_law/
files/comey.transcript.pdf.
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thus the program, and refused to recertify the program.Z 31
This rule seeks to replicate and systemize the incisive legal analysis and
dialogue undertaken by Goldsmith and Justice Department officials on that
occasion. The rule requires senior lawyers to probe deep enough so that they may
be aware of the best, independent legal advice rather than the opinion which
simply supports the Executive Branch action.
Requiring sustained and substantive dialogue between superiors and subordinates also addresses the problem of sub silentio communications common to
many hierarchical organizations.Z32 In many corporate offices, superiors do not
provide precise instmctions to subordinates, relieving themselves of knowledge,
permitting them to "declare that a mistake was made." 233 Binding opinions on
matters of the most sensitive nature should not be crafted out of senior Executive
lawyers' manufactured ignorance or willful blindness.
While Justice Department officials Ashcroft and Chertoff took part in some
discussions about the memoranda, their actions were ultimately passive. 234
Despite apparent misgivings, neither took any corrective action. 235 By increasing
responsibility, they become duty bound to defend the opinions. As studies of
accountability indicate, the "expectation that [people] will have to justify their
decision leads people to think more carefully and logically, and not to be satisfied
with using unarticulated criteria or unsubstantiated empirical judgments to arrive
at answers. " 236
Under the new rule, senior lawyers would be obligated to discern deficiencies
and to remonstrate with the author over the flawed analysis, and to either bring
the errors to a superior's attention or refuse to sign the memoranda. It is precisely
Ashcroft's and Chertoff's insufficiently engaged and passive role that the
proposed rule seeks to transform into one of active engagement. Superiors need
to state explicitly what they want done, direct a set of actions that accords with
professional rules, and prevent or correct unethical conduct when they know of it
or should have known of it.
C. EXPANDED DEFINITION OF SUPERVISOR

The new mle defines supervisor to include not only the direct supervisor and
those with managerial responsibility at OLC, i.e., the Assistant Attorney General
who heads OLC, but also attorneys in other components of the Justice
Department and the Executive Branch. For example, the Assistant Attorney

231. Id.
232. See Rostain, Partners and Power, supra note 149, at 285.
233. See id. at 285 n.18 (quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAzEs: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS
201 (1988)).
.
234. See supra Part I. C.
235. See id.
236. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 157, at 628.
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General in charge of the Criminal Division, the State Department legal adviser, or
the Department of Defense General Counsel, who each review OLC opinions
relating to their areas of expertise, would be considered the opinion authors'
supervisors as well, and would be held to the same constructive knowledge
standard as other supervisors.
An emphasis on supervisory responsibility by its very nature expands the
universe of concerns beyond just one bad lawyer's self-interest to look at the
institution, which is represented by the supervisors. The supervisors are asked to
be regulators themselves, and are not permitted to focus simply on their own
"self-interest" as the critique goes. 237 By clarifying that senior lawyers bear
supervisory responsibility when they review and comment on the drafting of
memoranda, these lawyers will be compelled to criticize problems more
forcefully and take steps to prevent the finalization of problematic advice into a
formal opinion.
The expanded definition of supervisor also addresses the "fundamentally
social character" and "professional culture" of the opinion drafting process, 238
recognizing that senior lawyers from government offices play significant roles in
the drafting of OLC memoranda. No OLC opinion is drafted in isolation.
1.

THE APPJHETIC BYSTANDER PROBLEM

To be clear, the purpose of the proposed rule is not to numerically expand the
people responsible. Indeed as social scientists have observed, increasing the
number of people aware of a problem may diffuse responsibility for acting. 239
For example, the infamous 1964 case of Kitty Genovese, in which a woman was
repeatedly stabbed and eventually killed in earshot of 38 people, may be seen not
as an example of the decay of moral values, but as an instance of bystander
"apathy. " 240
Studies animated in part by that dreadful incident have drawn the conclusion
that people in groups who are faced with a problem will often assume that

237. See Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 141, at 1302-03.
238. Jd. at 1337-38.
239. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 28 (2002); John M. Darley & Bibb Latane, Bystander
Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 8,
377-383 (1968), available at http://www.wadsworth.com/psychology _d/templates/student_resources/
0155060678_rathus/ps/ps 19 .html.
240. Darley & Latane, supra note 239, at 377-383; see also Stanley Milgram & Paul Hollander, "The Murder
They Heard" The Nation, June 15, 1964, Volume 198, No. 25 ("[D]id the witnesses remain passive because they
thought it was the right thing to do, or did they refrain from action despite what they thought or felt they should
do? We cannot take it for granted that people always do what they consider right. It would be more fruitful to
inquire why, in general and in this particular case, there is so marked a discrepancy between values and
behavior."); BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 157, at 544-45 (drawing conclusion from Genovese case that idleness
by others leads individuals to think corrective action or intervention is inappropriate).
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someone else will address the problem or that there is not in fact any problem. 241
As we also saw in the crafting of the torture memoranda, a number of attorneys
who were briefed on, or reviewed, the opinions, did not take significant steps to
rectify the many flaws. This failure to act may be attributed to a dangerous default
position common to many in the lawyering profession, what Professor Robert K.
Vischer terms "moral disengagement," "the tendency of lawyers to disclaim any
responsibility for the moral dimension of the representation. " 242 The lack of
action can further be attributed to the likely awareness that no one else had
objected strenuously to the contents of the memo. 243 Accordingly, the goal here is
to ensure that the many social interactions that an opinion's drafting elicits are not
ones with passive or apathetic bystanders, but instead are meaningful exchanges,
in which those who are supervisors understand that they are in fact responsible
and act based upon a set of ethical values. In short, they own the memoranda too;
they are responsible for their subordinates' work product.
In the OLC context, concerns over bystander apathy are more pronounced
because of OLC's role as expositor of Executive law. Senior lawyers advising on
draft OLC opinions cannot assume a passive or apathetic role in the face of
misconduct. And yet it appears this is precisely the deferential relationship OPR
approved in its report in its exoneration of Ashcroft, Chertoff, and others. 244
2.

PUBLIC LEGAL OFFICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Expanding supervisory responsibility to include politically appointed lawyers
who require Senate confirmation increases the likelihood that the underlying
norms and culture of OLC will be clarified?45 Holding political appointees
accountable, who may be public figures, makes it more politically difficult for
these lawyers to invoke a purely instrumentalist defense of simply serving the

241. Gladwell, supra note 239, at 28; Darley & Latane, supra note 239, at 377-83; BREST & KruEGER, supra
note 157, at 539-49 (discussing literature on social conformity).
242. Robert K. Vischer, Professionalizing Moral Engagement (A Response to Michael Hatfield), l04 Nw.
U. L. REv. CoLLOQUY 33 (2009).
243. The failure to object in the workplace is not unique to the legal profession. Employees, even at
executive levels, rarely raise problems that they perceive in an organization with their superiors. See
HEFFERNAN, supra note 227, at 93-94 (citing Frances J. Milliken & Elizabeth W. Morrison, et al.; An
Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don't Communicate Upward and Why, JOURNAL
OF MANAGEMENT STUD!ES 40(6): 1453-1476 (2003) (finding that 85 percent of executives reported instances of
being unable to raise issue or concerns with their bosses). See also Sims, supra note 227, at 652 (discussing
Onyx Corporation case study and the employees' failure to express reservations).
244. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 259.
245. Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson raises questions over whether lawyers involved as policymakers
can ever provide independent legal advice. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence,
42 CONN. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (2009). Robertson suggests that it was Yoo's policy role that helps explain his
aggressive opinions in the service of the Executive client. Id. In contrast, Goldsmith, who was not involved in
policies, could view the memo from a dispassionate stance, and ultimately decide to withdraw the Bybee Memo.
Id.
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client and making a purely defensible legal analysis. Indeed, the public is far less
likely than the professional bar to stomach professional role obligations as a basis
for suspect legal analysis. By making it difficult for high level attorneys to simply
hide behind legal analyses of subordinates, it requires that legal opinions be
informed by a normative foundation reflecting moral values, rather than simply
anchoring them in the ethic of zealous client advocacy. 246
High level government lawyers might be expected to adhere to what Spaulding
terms an "ethic of professional independence." 247 It is not unreasonable to expect
that lawyers, who have been approved by Congress, and are therefore, in some
sense more accountable, be more predisposed to "embody the attributes of
responsibility (proportionality, detachment, sensitivity to social consequences,
etc.) even when they see themselves as internally animated by the same ultimate
ends held by the politicians they serve." 248 A more expansive definition of
supervisor requires that senior legal officials be held responsible for maintaining
an appropriate balance of these tensions.
Indeed, it is desirable that decisions of such magnitude as whether interrogation techniques constitute torture be made by lawyers at senior levels who are
more accountable to the public by virtue of their public profile and political
appointment?49 These unique lawyers who straddle the intersection of law and
policy (and lawmalcing and policymaking) should be expected to engage in "a
moral dialogue" within the Executive Branch as they craft and oversee legal
opinions of great import. 250 The proposed rule ensures their participation and
ultimate accountability.
This latter benefit of a more expansive and rigorous formulation of reasonable
supervision would obviate the critique of the OPR report (and, by extension, the

246. Increasing the number of lawyers involved in an opinion whose roles and responsibility are carefully
delineated may also improve the quality of the opinion. Researchers have found that the measurable collective
intelligence of groups can exceed that of the groups' individual members' intelligence. See Anita Williams
Woolley, et al., Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in the Peifonnance of Human Groups, SCIENCE
330, 686, 687 (2010), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6004/686.full.pdf?keytype=
ref&siteid=sci&ijkey=i18Ab9gV6Wr9o. Furthermore, "groups where a few people dominated the conversation were less collectively intelligent than those with a more equal distribution of conversational tum-taking."
/d. at 688. Thus, rather than allow any one OLC lawyer to dominate in writing the opinion, the opinion should be
vetted by a group of lawyers with equal say on the content of the opinion to ensure the highest caliber opinion.
247. Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1952.
248. /d. at 1952; see also BAKER, supra note 29, at 25 ("In a constitutional democracy, who makes the
decision can be as important as the substance of the decision .... Where the capacity to decide is discretionary,
good process guides decisions to appropriate actors, who are accountable and who may invoke electoral or
appointive legitimacy and credibility."); BEST & KruEGER, supra note 157, at 627-29 (discussing approaches to
improving decision making and accountability).
249. See Zacharias, supra note 29, at 346; BAKER, supra note 29, at 25.
250. Vischer contends that it is "[e]specially in cases where the governing law is indeterminate," such as
those the OLC often confronts, "lawyers need to be able to engage their clients in a moral dialogue, which
requires both familiarity with, and sensitivity to, moral reasoning." Vischer, supra note 242, at 37-38. Higher
level accountability makes that engagement more likely as senior lawyers are more likely to have the temerity
and gravitas to confront and oppose other senior policymakers.
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over-individualized nature of external regulation of lawyers in general)-that it
addressed only the manner, and not the result, of the torture memoranda. By
holding more lawyers responsible for ensuring that memoranda are thoroughly
and independently crafted, a more substantive discourse between lawyers and
policymakers will occur. At the very least, it should elicit a debate, perhaps a
public one, over whether "aggressive, but defensible" is both an acceptable basis
for policy and lens through which to assess legal reasoning for the Executive.
D. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED RULE-CASE STUDIES

Had the proposed rule been in place at the time of the drafting of the Bybee
Memorandum, a broader group of supervisors would have been held responsible
for the Memorandum's errors. These individuals had reason to know, or should
have known, of the opinion's flaws, but failed to correct them, and also failed to
mitigate their consequences.
1.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF

In his review of the Bybee Memo, Assistant Attorney General and chief of the
Criminal Division Michael Chertoff did not make substantial efforts to prevent
the inclusion of the Specific Intent or Commander-in-Chief sections. To whatever
extent he expressed disagreement with the analysis, Chertoff apparently communicated his concerns only to Yoo. 251 If he felt that this should not have been a
binding legal opinion that would support interrogation techniques and potentially
function as an effective declination to prosecute, he did not take sufficient steps to
prevent the signing. It is not clear whether OPR considered Chertoff's responsibility under Rule 5.1. Arguably, Chertoff was not Yoo's supervisor or managing
attorney because of his position within the Criminal Division, a division distinct
from the OLC. However, under the proposed rule, Chertoff would have to. be
considered a supervisor given his hierarchical position and, more importantly, the
role that he took in advising Yoo. Chertoff was sought out for his legal advice
because of his authority as the head of the Criminal Division and his expertise.
His role should be seen as similar to that of a partner who specializes in criminal
litigation brought in to advise on the criminal ramifications of a transaction
structured by the merger and acquisitions group. He cannot abdicate responsibility to supervise that work, particularly as it relates to his area of advice.
As a supervisor under the new rule Chertoff should have known that the
weaknesses in the Bybee Memo lacked independence and constituted professional misconduct. He should have scrutinized the drafts at a greater level than he
apparently did. And, where the memoranda veered from the rules' requirements
of objectivity and candor, for example, he should have taken steps to edit them

251. See OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 59.
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accordingly, or prevented the signing of the memoranda. The national security
and human rights implications of the subject of the Memo would also argue for
action to be taken by Chertoff. Given the sensitive subject matter, it is hardly too
taxing to require a high level lawyer to review closely the Memo and to be held
accountable for failing to reasonably supervise its crafting.
In addition, Model Rule 5.2 provides that it would have been Chertoff, as the
head of the Criminal Division, who should have been responsible for the advice
in the memo concerning criminal matters. As a lawyer with little to no criminal
experience, Yoo sought Chertoff's opinion on specific intent. Assuming this was
a close question, it was Chertoff's responsibility to advise against adoption of the
cramped interpretations, not Yoo's.
As for the Commander-in-Chief section, Chertoff was well aware that the CIA
had sought an advance pardon for instances in which the CIA violated the torture
statute. In fact, it was Chertoff who had refused as head of the Criminal Division
to issue an advance pardon, yet here he was in effect acquiescing in an opinion
that would be utilized to defend against charges of torture. Indeed Chertoff
delivered a somewhat opaque comment, "I'm not in a position to sign onto
this." 252 Taken either as refusal to sign off on the view or a denial of
responsibility (i.e., "it is not my place to sign this"), Chertoff did not take
sufficient action to prevent these sections from being inserted as it does not
appear he communicated this to anyone besides Yoo. Under the new rule it would
be abundantly clear that Chertoff would be expected to know and to act by virtue
of his stature, expertise, and involvement in the opinion drafting process, as well
as the significance of the issue. He would be expected to bring any concerns to the
attention of the Attorney General and even to the President.
2.

JOHN ASHCROFT

John Ashcroft would also have failed to reasonably supervise Yoo and Bybee
under the proposed rule. 253 According to the OPR Report, it would appear that
Ashcroft never read the Bybee Memo. 254 However, Ashcroft was briefed on the
contents of the opinion. Under the Model Rule one could plausibly contend that
Ashcroft lacked actual knowledge of the weaknesses in the opinion because he
never read the Bybee Memo. Under the proposed rule, however, the inquiry is
whether Ashcroft had reason to know or should have known of the weaknesses.
Failing to read the memorandum is no defense; he should have read the opinion,

252. OPR REPORT, supra note 3, at 59.
253. See Power, supra note 13, at 89-97 (discussing Ashcroft's responsibility under Rule 5.!). Recall also
that Condoleezza Rice claims she told Ashcroft "personally to review and confirm" the drafts. See also S.
Armed Services Comm., Inquiry, supra note 88, at 35.
254. Under the proposed rule, the import of the Bybee Memorandum, particularly its determination that the
torture statute could not limit Executive action, would have necessitated the Attorney General's signature. See
Bybee Memorandum, supra note 2, at 31.
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and he should have probed more deeply. His role as supervisor would be even
more pronounced given that he did in fact read the Classified Bybee Memo and
authorized the interrogation techniques. One critical purpose of the proposed rule
is to encourage meaningful participation by superiors in the most critical legal
matters. On such an important matter, Ashcroft should have read the Bybee
Memorandum particularly where he would authorize the techniques. He would
then be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the flaws in the underlying
analysis. To the extent Ashcroft might seek to justify his authorization based upon
the view that the analysis was "aggressive, but defensible," any ethics inquiry
would necessarily address this explanation, thereby engaging in a discourse on
the norms governing Executive law and lawyers.
E. OBJECTIONS

One concern posed by the suggested rule is that it would dilute the authority of
OLC opinions by recognizing lawyers outside of OLC as supervisors and
requiring that they correct analyses drafted by OLC lawyers. 255 The intent of the
proposed rule is not to diminish the weight of OLC opinions; rather, the objective
is to ensure that drafts of the opinion are not regarded as unassailable, and
thereby encourage meaningful criticisms on drafts by supervisors to ensure that
the ultimate and binding memo is correct. 256 This rule recognizes yet another
structural limitation of OLC-not all matters can be addressed by a small office
of twenty-five attorneys in secret; nor should they be.
A second related concern raised by the proposed rule is that in opening up the
heretofore relatively isolated OLC lawyers to the supervision of other offices'
lawyers, their objectivity and neutrality would be threatened. 257 There is perhaps
potential for this, but it also sheds light on the fantasy that twenty-five lawyers
can or should make the law in isolation. Indeed, as described above, it may be

255. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 13, at 1462. Morrison contends that OLC's advice carries more weight
than other agencies' legal opinions precisely because the latter-notwithstanding their expertise-are "in-house
legal staff," with a greater self-interest in appeasing the agency client, whereas OLC is external to any agency,
and thus has less pressure to ingratiate itself with the client.ld. at 1461-63, 1465.
256. The Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel reflect the same ameliorative objective to ensure
greater accuracy by recommending OLC's solicitation of relevant agencies' expertise. Guidelines, supra note 4,
at 1609 ("The involvement of affected entities serves as an additional check against erroneous reasoning by
ensuring that all views and relevant information are considered. Administrative coordination allows OLC to
avail itself of the substantive expertise of the various components of the executive branch and to avoid
overlooking potentially important consequences before rendering advice."). Obtaining alternative views helps
address the potentially homogenous views of OLC lawyers, which can foster the willful blindness of an
institution. See HEFFERNAN, supra note 227, at 233.
257. As with the first objection, OLC's authority is predicated upon its purported independence due to the
fact that it is not aligned with an Executive agency; it is not "in-house" counsel for any one agency. Morrison,
supra note 13. at 1461-63. Of course, OLC may be viewed as "in-house" counsel for the President, which
presents tremendous countervailing pressures on its independence and objectivity, as is discussed throughout
this Article.
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unrealistic to think that OLC ever was, or ever will be, walled off from the
influences of lawyers of other agencies. Certainly Yoo was influenced by, or at
least not removed from, the views of the CIA counsel and advocates of aggressive
interrogation techniques in the White House. Defining supervisor to include
senior lawyers from other agencies and Justice Department components who
must review or comment on the draft opinions recognizes the inherently social
and collective nature of the legal process?58 The requirement that views outside
of OLC be considered ensures a modicum of diversity and dissent that may
temper the risk of groupthink. 259 Entrusting additional legal officials with greater
responsibility also places another potential check against undue influence from
the Executive client, particularly when it is the President.
A third objection to the proposed rule is that it is predicated upon the conceit
that the crafting of the memoranda reflects a normative void and was solely the
product of client-centered advocacy, untethered to rule of law concems? 60
Instead, however, the opinions might be better viewed as the outgrowth of what
OLC lawyers and their superiors considered "an appropriate new legal framework," aggressively focused on modem terrorism? 61 These lawyers were not
then acting without conscience, as Luban has suggested. To the contrary,
Spaulding argues, "they acted as moral activists or 'cause lawyers,' seeking to
vindicate, not disregard, their own strongly held moral, political, and legal
views." 262 To the extent Spaulding's observation is correct, and I think there is
much merit to it, what corrective or alternative norm might be expected to be
generated out of a compelled discourse of superiors?
While it is true that many in the Bush Administration, including senior
lawyers, believed ardently in the need for a "New Normal" in confronting
twenty-first century terrbrism/63 I contend that compelling greater supervisory
responsibility for the supporting secret legal analyses by lower level lawyers
would have ensured modulation of the opinions. John Yoo may well have
258. See Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1609.
259. See Sims, supra note 227, at 660-61 (discussing approaches that organizations should employ to reduce
the likelihood of groupthink).
260. See, e.g., Spaulding, supra note 22, at 1974-1975 (contending "a more complex set of sources" explains
OLC's "professional failure").
261. /d. at 1976; see also id. at 1975-76 (characterizing problem as "an excess ofpurposivism, not an excess
of narrowly client-centered lawyering").
262. /d. at 1975; see also Vischer, supra note 242, at 33 ("There is no reason to believe, however, that Yoo's
moral intuition would have led him to reject the conclusions set forth in the memos, and there is some evidence
that his moral intuition helped shape his analysis.").
263. See, e.g., Ben Fenton, Cheney Retums With Waming on 'New Way ofLife, 'THE TELEGRAPH, October 27,
2001; Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House General Counsel to President George W. Bush, Re:
Decision ReApplication of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with AI Qaeda and the
Taliban, 2 (January 25, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/gnzls 12502mem2
gwb2.html ("[T]he war against terrorism is a new kind of war.... In my judgment, this new paradigm renders
obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its
provisions ...").
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sincerely believed in the President's wartime authority to override congressional
enactments, but it is another matter to expect the Attorney General and other
senior Executive lawyers to all have been prepared to "sign onto" that extreme
legal framework. Nor should it be acceptable to cede this legal authority to a
politically unaccountable lawyer such as Yoo.
Delineating clearly the roles of supervisors and their attendant duties to
establish standards of ethical conduct and independence, but also their duties to
know of, and to rectify, misconduct, ensure that politically accountable senior
lawyers understand in greater detail the legal bases that purport to support any
new normative foundation. As the Terrorist Surveillance Program incident
illustrated, partisan senior lawyers can be dissuaded from a policy decision when
it is demonstrated that the legal analysis undergirding that policy is suspect.
Holding senior lawyers responsible as supervisors under a constructive
knowledge standard forces senior lawyers to determine whether an "aggressive,
but defensible" standard is the appropriate norm by which to measure OLC
opinions. Their own moral judgments may come into play, as Luban would
encourage, and as may be appropriate given their roles in often deciding mixed
questions of law and policy. Senior Executive lawyers cannot adopt an apathetic
bystander position or push down OLC opinions. The memoranda do not serve as
mere functionary components of a bureaucracy but rather are the effective law of
the Executive. Accordingly, senior Executive lawyers must regard the memoranda in their capacities as regulators of subordinate lawyers, and as publicly
accountable lawmakers, with a primary "obligation to see that justice is done. " 264
CONCLUSION

In the post-9111 landscape, the Executive will continue to seek greater
authority and power, often in secret, in the name of national security. With
infrequent external checks and balances from the other branches of government,
an effective, internal executive process is critical to guaranteeing the legality of
Executive actions. The OLC torture memoranda demonstrate that the process is
deficient. These opinions, and the aftermath of proposed OLC reforms and ethics
investigations, evidence too great a concern for the prerogatives and authority of
the Executive, particularly during crisis periods, at the expense of the best,
independent legal advice. Holding senior lawyers accountable for the work of
their OLC subordinates is critical to ensuring that opinions are of the finest and
most independent quality.
A precisely defined executive process is necessary to ensure that the Executive
is provided independent legal advice rather than relying solely upon amorphous
OLC cultural norms and professional integrity. However, a limited focus on

264. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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professional misconduct by the individual OLC lawyers who draft the opinions is
insufficient. By requiring a two-year rotation of OLC chiefs, installing an ethics
adviser within OLC, and requiring the Attorney General's signature on novel
opinions, the proposed rule would establish a process better suited to providing
independent advice. These structural changes would better insulate legal
opinions from the tendency to automatically approve Executive positions and
would delineate greater authority and responsibility to more accountable actors.
In addition, the new rule would make clear the obligation to provide independent
legal advice and widen the zone of responsibility for OLC subordinates'
opinions, holding senior lawyers responsible for unethical conduct when they
had reason to know, or should have known, of the deficiencies, and failed to
correct the errors or rectify the consequences. The proposed rule and process
make clear that OLC cannot write a blank check for the Executive Branch.

